914 Chapters
Medium 9780253354839

2. Enemy of the Species

Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands Indiana University Press ePub

LADELLE MCWHORTER

For at least a decade, a common strategy for promoting acceptance of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities in many corporate and educational institutions has been to insist that diversity in any population is superior to homogeneity. Homogeneity, it is said, tends toward stagnation. If the “population” is a work team, for example, advocates of diversity suggest that homogeneity of perspective is likely to equal redundancy of ideas and approaches—in other words, impoverished creativity leading to reduced productivity. If the population is a student body, advocates suggest that homogeneity of background and social position is likely to result in reinforcement of received opinions rather than educational challenge and advancement. Diversity, then, is a crucial factor in healthy development; it is a stimulus to improvement and a defense against the stupidity of unquestioned routine.

Some advocates for lgbtq inclusion in corporate and educational institutions have claimed the same benefits for sexual diversity and diversity of gender expression. Steven Keyes, vice president for compensation, benefits, and human resources policy at Nationwide Insurance, explains, “Having a corporate culture that embraces diversity improves the productivity of our associates, helps the company recruit the best talent and makes Nationwide more competitive in the insurance and financial services industry” (Keyes 2007). In my home university, the University of Richmond, lgbtq and allied groups have spent years petitioning for inclusion in the institution’s ongoing “diversity initiative” in the hope of receiving recognition, material support for programming, and protection from discrimination and harassment. Institutions such as mine consider diversity valuable, so the most obvious way to persuade institutional elites to accept and protect queer people is to present ourselves as representatives of a form of diversity, sexual diversity.

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Medium 9780253012029

Conclusion: The Last Question: Self-redemption or Divine Redemption?

Espen Dahl Indiana University Press ePub

In this book I have tried to elaborate the analogies and overlappings between Cavell’s philosophy and his religious perspective, either expressed philosophically or theologically. If such an undertaking might be deemed risky, it is because of Cavell’s own repeated resistance toward certain Christian depictions of the human state as helpless, fixed, awaiting supernatural aid, pursuing untimely theologizing, and the like. This resistance has been emphasized by his commentators and has often been taken as Cavell’s prevalent attitude. Especially in chapter 1 but also in the subsequent chapters, I have tried to oppose such interpretations—not because they are wrong (indeed, they touch on an undeniable dimension of Cavell’s thought), but because I think they reveal only half of the story. It has been worthwhile to bring out both dimensions of Cavell’s ambiguous attitude toward religion—both its dismissive and its affirmative dimensions. Accordingly, I hope that my way of expanding on Cavell’s suggestions, notes, and hints has proved a possible way to extend his conversation with religion and theology—sometimes posed as arguments, sometimes as competitions and sometimes dismissive, but also often encouraging. Since my interest lies in countering the impression of Cavell as hostile to religion as such, my efforts run the danger of overemphasizing the other side of the story, as if he were providing a philosophical preparation or afterthought to lived religion or theological principles. But there are certainly dividing lines that Cavell will not cross.

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Medium 9780253353498

Chapter 1: The Being-There of Human Beings as the Indigenous Character of Conceptuality

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

The consideration of the being-there of human beings as being-in-the-world has been brought to a certain conclusion. This being-in-the-world has the basic character of its being in λóγος. Λóγος pervades being-in. What is preserved in λóγος is the manner and mode in which the world and the being-there that is itself discovered therein are opened up. Λóγος disposes over the particular discoveredness and openedness of the world. It allows us the directions in which being-there can interrogate the world and itself.

Toward what purpose did the interrogating of the world and of the being-there of the human beings in it strive? It was examined with respect to the indigenous character of conceptuality, specifically with the purpose of understanding conceptuality itself. And that because only in conceptuality is every concept to be understood as what it is. Insofar as conceptuality is understood, the guiding clue to seeing concrete concepts is given. It had the purpose of setting forth basic concepts, of making conceptuality visible, and appropriating it for the understanding thereof. It sought conceptuality where conceptuality itself is at home and as such, from where it arises: that being in which something like conceptuality can be. With the emphasis on the indigenous character of conceptuality—on its indigenous Greek character—we have fulfilled a task that is placed before every interpretation, insofar as interpretation needs to be oriented by that of which it speaks.

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Medium 9780253356734

4. 1 Corinthians 11:23

Kierkegaard, Søren Indiana University Press ePub

[ 4 ]

Remind, O Jesus, oft my heart        

Of your distress, anguish, and need

Remind me of your soul’s pain. 1   

 

Yes, you our Lord and Savior, not even in this respect do we dare put trust in our own strength, as if we were able by ourselves to evoke deeply enough or constantly to hold fast your memory, we who would so much rather dwell on the joyful than on the sorrowful, we who all desire good days, the peace and security of happy times, we who certainly wish to remain in a deeper sense ignorant of horrors lest, as we foolishly think, they might make our happy life gloomy and serious, oh, or as it seems to us, our unhappy life still more gloomy and serious. Therefore we pray to you, you who are indeed the one we want to remember, we pray to you that you yourself will remind us about that. Oh what a strange language a human being speaks when he must talk with you; it is indeed as if it had been rendered unfit for use when it has to describe our relation to you or yours to us. Is this even a remembrance when the one who is to be recollected must himself remind the one recollecting! Humanly speaking, only the high and mighty person who has so many and such important things to think about talks this way, saying to the lowly person: “You yourself must remind me to remember you.” Alas, and we say the same thing to you, you the Savior and Atoner of the world. Alas, and when we say it to you, this same thing is precisely the expression of our lowliness, our nothingness in comparison with you, you who with God are exalted above all heavens. 2 We pray that you yourself will remind us of your suffering and death, remind us often, at our work, in our joy and in our sorrow, of the night in which you were betrayed. We beseech you for this and we thank you when you remind us; we also thank you in this way, as those who are now gathered here today, by going up to your altar in order to renew communion with you.

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Medium 9780253211903

30. A Sketch of Logical Critics (1911)

Edited by the Peirce Edition Project Indiana University Press ePub

 

MS 675. [In the spring of 1909, J. W. Slaughter and G. F. Stout, two friends of Victoria Lady Welby, decided to honor her with a collection of essays on “Signifies,” and eagerly sought a contribution from Peirce. He was glad to accept, but ill health slowed him down until a reminder from Slaughter, in April 1911, revived his impetus. MS 675, probably written in August 1911, is one of the more polished versions of Peirce’s eventually unsuccessful attempt to complete his assignment. Maybe as a consequence, the collection of essays was never published.] Although this writing is at most only a fragment of the paper Peirce had in mind, it contains important clarifications and sheds much light on the late trajectory of Peirce’s thought. By “logical critics,” Peirce means “the theory of the kinds and degrees of assurance that can be afforded by the different ways of reasoning.” This is, for Peirce, a semiotic question, and one that exercised him a great deal in his later years. Although he never really reaches the question here, he does come to discuss “precisely” what we mean by “reasoning,” and points out that it is only one of two ways that knowledge is acquired, the other being experience. Belief acquired through reasoning must be justified by what preceded it in our minds; but belief gained from experience needs no justification. Peirce discusses two faults with his 1877-78 pragmatism papers: his definition of “belief,” and his failure to see that “a true would-be is as real as an actuality.” He concludes with a call for a cooperative scientific attack on the “problems of the nature, properties, and varieties of Signs.”

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