Results for: “Philosophy”
|Charles S. Peirce||Indiana University Press|
7 October 1892
AT FIRST BLUSH. COUNTER-GOSPELS
Philosophy, when just emerging from its golden pupa-skin, mythology, proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be
Love. Or, since this pirate-lingo, English, is poor in such-like words, let us say Eros, the exuberance-love. Afterwards, Empedocles set up passionate-love and hate as the two coördinate powers of the universe. In some passages, kindness is the word. But certainly, in any sense in which it has an opposite, to be senior partner of that opposite, is the highest position that love can attain. Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller, in whose days those views were familiar topics, made the One
Supreme Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love. What, then, can he say to hate? Never mind, at this time, what the scribe of the apocalypse, if he were John, stung at length by persecution into a rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of heaven, and so become the Slanderer of God to men, may have dreamed. The question is rather what the sane John thought, or ought to have thought, in order to carry out his idea consistently. His statement that God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether God bears us love or hatred. “Nay,” saysSee All Chapters
Periissem, nisi periissem [I would have perished, had I not perished] still is and will be my life motto. This is why I have been able to endure what long since would have killed someone else who was not dead.1
—KIERKEGAARD, SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S JOURNALS AND PAPERS
Confessing in this journal entry from 1848 that, without dying willingly, death would have prevailed over him, Kierkegaard discloses how a life of suffering has prevented death from laying its claim to one who was already dead. Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the Latin aphorism further expresses an integral spiritual dialectic at the heart of Lutheran Christian subjectivity, that is, the power of a metaphorical or symbolic death to deliver the soul from the prospect of its actual eternal death. Or, more existentially, the voluntary death to oneself by which the self is delivered from its own living spiritual death: an undead condition of the self—articulated by Kierkegaard through the rubric of despair—that anticipates or forebodes its final, absolute death at the conclusion of a life unconscious, or defiant, of the recognition that it exists inexorably before God.See All Chapters
The Intentional Encounter with “the World”
IN HUMAN, ALL Too Human, Nietzsche begins his investigation by considering the human encounter with objects in the world.1 His approach to the problem is initially conducted via a critique of Kant’s philosophy in the first chapter, “Of First and Last Things.” The book, written for the free spirit—the one that is freed from all alienating metaphysical illusions—was written in the spirit of the Enlightenment and was dedicated to Voltaire, “one of the greatest liberators of the spirit.”2 However, being a liberating book and one for the free spirit (or one for the spirit to be freed) does not make Human, All Too Human a rejection of the quest for truth. Quite the contrary: the task for Nietzsche is to reject everything that, up until now, has passed as truth in order to uncover the true nature of the human, his place in the world, and the relation between the human being and the world. Nietzsche thus puts to work Kant’s call, “Sapere Aude!”—Dare to know—that Enlightenment call for the human being to stop relying on authority and to seek knowledge for oneself, using the power of one’s spirit. This appetite for knowledge, paired with the courage that is necessary for it, implies a critique and a questioning of the philosophical tradition.3See All Chapters
|Charles S. Peirce||Indiana University Press|
Algebra of the Copula
The copula of consequence, R, may be deﬁned as follows: a. If b is true, then a R b is true. b. Either a or a R b is true. g. If a R b and a are true, b is true.
The letters a and b may be replaced by propositions, that replacing a proposition which is the antecedent of another being written in parenthesis. Thus, we shall have the forms following:
With 0 copula:
With 1 copula:
A R B.
With 2 copulas: (A R B ) R C
A R B R C.
With 3 copulas: [(A R B ) R C] R D
(A R B R C ) R D
(A R B ) R C R D
A R (B R C ) R D
A R B R C R D.
With 4 copulas, there are 14 forms; with 5, 42; with 6, 132; etc. The last letter of a proposition is called its consequent; all those which are followed by copulas not under parentheses are called antecedents. In like manner, the propositions under parentheses have consequents and antecedents.
The copula may also be considered as deﬁned by the following two propositions.
PROPOSITION I. If from a proposition, P, a proposition, Q, follows, we may write P R Q.See All Chapters
|Edward S. Casey||Indiana University Press||ePub|
What is the strange difference between an experience tasted for the first time and the same experience recognized as familiar, as having been enjoyed before, though we cannot name it or say where or when?
—William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890)
I am arriving at the airport in South Bend, Indiana. A figure comes striding toward me, his hand extended. Is it Tom? I cannot recognize him at first, as a large straw hat is drawn down over his face. Then, suddenly, the hat is thrown off, and I just as suddenly recognize who it is: Charles! Although I have not seen Charles since last fall (it is now June), he is instantly recognizable—and clearly distinguishable from Tom, who nevertheless resembles Charles in physique and whom I had expected to meet me on this occasion.
It is striking how much of this experience is present-oriented. One present moment—that of the quasi-recognition of Tom—gives way instantaneously to another present moment, that of actually recognizing Charles. Each moment is all-absorbing, and is occupied without remainder by an act of quasi-or real recognition. The act serves to punctuate the present—to give it its special content and its immediate limits. There is a definite fixation on the present, an anchoring of attention there, as well as a felt presentness of the experience itself as it gives itself to me in the moment of recognition.See All Chapters