1388 Chapters
Medium 9781907556579

4 Ball Games

Alan Hyde M-Y Books Ltd ePub



1.     Medal Strokeplay Record all strokes taken, then take off the individuals allowed strokes (handicap) this is their Medal score, lowest score wins

2.     Medal Stableford Highest Stableford score wins.

3.     Chicago All players play off scratch (no shots allowed) and score normal Stableford points. Players final score is total Stableford score + their handicap (rounded to nearest whole number .5 goes up) 39. Highest score wins. E.g Player with handicap of 10 scores 30 points off scratch = 30+1039=+1

4.     Medway All players start with 45 points. They then score normally under Stableford points system. They take this score from 45 and lowest score wins.

5.     Skins A Skin is when 1 player wins the hole outright. The Player with the most skins at the end of the round wins. If no one wins the hole outright then that skin can be carried over, so the next holes is worth 2 skins to an outright winner.

1.     Matchplay The player who wins most holes wins (see definition of Matchplay)

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Medium 9780253211859

Importance, Significance, and Meaning (1949)

LARRY A HICKMAN Indiana University Press ePub

This essay marks an attempt to develop a number of considerations which are reasonably fundamental in the theory of knowing and of what it is to be known, which form the substance of a recently published collection of articles by A. F. Bentley and the present writer.1 The articles that are gathered together in this volume had been prepared for by a series of prior publications. Omitting periodical publications, reference may be made here to the following works by Bentley: Process of Government (1908, reprinted 1935, 1949); Relativity in Man and Society (1926); and Behavior, Knowledge, Fact (1935); while Dewey had followed How We Think (1910) by his Essays in Experimental Logic (1916); and a more systematic treatise, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). It is pertinent to note that the positions set forth in the recent joint volume had been in process of independent maturing for some forty years; the book thus represents a view which, whatever else be said about it, is not casual nor improvised but is the outcome of studies carried on over a long period and taking critical account, between them of a large number of traditional and contemporary movements. Moreover it has seemed to the writers that the convergence in conclusions of inquiries having different backgrounds and traversing different areas of subjectmatter is a valid source of increased confidence in the community positions that took shape as a consequence. It is relevant to the present essay (since it is by but one of the authors of the joint volume) to say that the unlikeness in original interest and background and in subjectmatter consists, speaking in general terms, in the fact that Bentley’s approach was distinctly from the side of science especially as contemporary developments in physical and biological science bear upon the problem of bringing into existence a competent scientific and effective method of inquiry into human relationships as they now exist; a work which involves a critical study of traditional and current psychological and societal theories with respect to their ineptness in providing intellectual instrumentalities that are competent to initiate and develop scientific study of the human relationships that constitute the modern or contemporary world.

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Medium 9781934989111

Chapter 2: Conditioning

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9781576752517

Chapter 6: What to Do?

Needleman, Jacob Berrett-Koehler Publishers ePub


What to do? It is that question that sends Eliot back in time to accompany himself as an adolescent at the threshold of manhood. In no way can he understand what Max means by remembering. Like the ancient pupil Tat standing before his teacher Hermes, Eliot finally bows his head in sorrow. “Max,” he says softly, “I can’t understand. What you’re asking is completely beyond my power.” And just as Hermes replies to Tat, Max answers, in his own idiom: “Cut it out, Appleman! Try . . . try. . . .”Wasn’t it Krishna himself, lord of the universe, who rebuked the warrior Arjuna for his sadness and his unwillingness to engage in a struggle he does not yet understand: “Why this lifeless dejection, Arjuna? . . . Fall not into this degrading weakness. . . . Fight, Arjuna!”

The emotional reactions that devour our time are only the most obvious evidence that our relationship to time depends primarily on our inner state and not on any objective characteristics of time itself. We are called to a struggle we do not yet understand; and therefore our first task is to try to see why, in spite of this, we must begin this incomprehensible work, this effort to remember the Self. When man is closer to the Self, time is no longer the enemy, so we are told by the ancient wisdom. It is the man who is less than Man whom time mercilessly destroys. It is the self that is less than the Self that is devoured by time.

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Medium 9780253355119

Chapter Two Theaetetus’s Answers to the Question of the Essence of Knowledge and their Rejection

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

T στιν πιστμη? This is the guiding question of the dialogue Theaetetus. The first answer runs: πιστμη = ασθησις, to know is to perceive, is perception. This answer will be rejected later on, but initially we will ask why precisely this answer is given and why this answer is given as the first.

We may make the assumption that in the dialogues the interlocutors do not babble randomly back and forth. Rather, the sequence of the discussion unfolds on the grounds of an originary understanding and speaking with one another.

Why precisely this answer? One can of course recall something from psychology textbooks: perception (ασθησις) is the lower cognitive capacity as compared to a higher one. But this is not what the conversation is about, nor is it a question of Plato’s wanting to refute Protagoras and perceptual relativism. His goal is not to refute but to exhibit the matter at hand.

The ground [for the first answer] in Plato’s text is more essential and deeper: it lies in the relationship between what πιστμη is in fact and what ασθησις means for the Greeks. We can recognize that this answer is not arbitrary from the fact that Aristotle, when he wants to designate the highest kind of knowing, νος, designates this apprehending as ασθησς τις [a kind of perception]. By this, he does not mean that somehow the essential relations of mores or of all the historicity of Being can be smelled with the nose or heard with the ears. Instead, ασθησις in its proper meaning as perceiving is taken up first as the essence of knowing, spontaneously as it were, because for the Greeks, perceiving and being perceived mean the same thing as ϕανεται: to say that this shows itself, something shows itself, is the same as saying that something is perceived.

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