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30. Evolutionary Love

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


Evolutionary Love

7 October 1892

Morris Library


Philosophy, when just emerging from its golden pupa-skin, mythology, proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be

Love. Or, since this pirate-lingo, English, is poor in such-like words, let us say Eros, the exuberance-love. Afterwards, Empedocles set up passionate-love and hate as the two coördinate powers of the universe. In some passages, kindness is the word. But certainly, in any sense in which it has an opposite, to be senior partner of that opposite, is the highest position that love can attain. Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller, in whose days those views were familiar topics, made the One

Supreme Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love. What, then, can he say to hate? Never mind, at this time, what the scribe of the apocalypse, if he were John, stung at length by persecution into a rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of heaven, and so become the Slanderer of God to men, may have dreamed. The question is rather what the sane John thought, or ought to have thought, in order to carry out his idea consistently. His statement that God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether God bears us love or hatred. “Nay,” says

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Five: The Paralogisms of Pure Reason: In Search of a Regulative Principle for Transcendental Reflection

Avery Goldman Indiana University Press ePub


The Paralogisms of Pure Reason:
In Search of a Regulative Principle
for Transcendental Reflection

I. The Faculty of Thinking (Axvii)

In the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, in what stands as the opening salvo of critical philosophy, Kant writes that although questions concerning “the faculty of thinking [das Vermögen zu denken]”—the mind, or reason, in the broadest and most undifferentiated sense—are important, they are not an essential part of the Transcendental Deduction, nor are they necessary for inquiry into the “faculty we call the understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use” (Axvi).1 What is central to the Transcendental Deduction is the demonstration of the objective validity of the categories of the understanding; and while one could also trace these categories and the faculty of understanding that they constitute back to their source, to the “faculty of thinking” itself, from out of which they have been distinguished, this latter task, which Kant describes as subjective, does not belong “essentially” to the Transcendental Deduction.

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6. It Is Difficult for a City with Good Laws to Come into Existence On Book 4

Edited by Gregory Recco and Eric Sanday Indiana University Press ePub

6    It is Difficult for a City with Good Laws to Come into Existence: On Book 4

Michael P. Zuckert

I. Prologue

The subtle action of Book 4 can be appreciated only when it is seen in relation to Book 3. Only at the end of Book 3 does Cleinias divulge to the Athenian that he and nine others have been charged to form a new colony. This is perhaps the most decisive and surprising moment of the dialogue. He seeks the Athenian’s aid in his enterprise. It is an amazing coincidence that one of these three idle talkers about laws actually has the opportunity to legislate. But more amazing is the observation we cannot help but make that Cleinias has been walking with this apparently knowledgeable Athenian since dawn and it is only now, three-quarters of the way to noon, that he divulges to the Stranger his task and only now attempts to enlist the Athenian in the enterprise. That new task sets the tone for the rest of the Laws, but most immediately for Book 4.

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Eleven: Is There a Heidegger—or, for That Matter, a Lacan—Beyond All Gathering?

Edited by Jeffrey Powell Indiana University Press ePub


Is There a Heidegger—or, for That Matter, a Lacan—Beyond All Gathering?

διαφερóμενον in Heidegger’s “Logos: Heraclitus B 50” as a Possible Response to Derrida’s Disquiet

David Farrell Krell

Is there a Heidegger beyond the seemingly omnipresent gesture of gathering? Is there a Heidegger who resists the unifying force of the One, τò, and who acknowledges the disseminating force of the many, A number of Heidegger’s translators have suggested that there is indeed such a Heidegger. Yet let it be said at the outset: translators of Heidegger, and especially of Heidegger’s “Logos” article, are a mad bunch at best, and are certainly not to be trusted. I am thinking of course of Jacques Lacan, who translated the “Logos” article of Heidegger into French decades ago.1

One wonders what could have drawn Lacan to such a text. Perhaps he was attracted to Heidegger’s “Logos” by its early remarks on reason and unreason, the rational and irrational, both of which our tradition, according to Heidegger, equally neglects in their essential provenance: irraison and déraison would be, as it were, Lacan’s home territory in the Heideggerian landscape; the relation of these words to raison could constitute the very ethics, or at least the ethos, of psychoanalysis, which takes the book of reason so seriously that it attempts to swallow it whole.2 Or could Lacan have been excited by the notion of an irresistible gathering that occurs in and through language, a Versammlung in and through a unique unifying One—the of Heraclitus’s fragment B 50, as read by Heidegger? Or, quite to the contrary, could he have espied in Heidegger’s reading, in spite of the unique-unifying-One, a force of resistance or interruption that disrupts all gathering of the In any case, must not Jacques Derrida have been troubled by Lacan’s attraction to this essay, inasmuch as almost everything in Lacan and a great deal of what is in Heidegger—above all, the insistence on gathering, versammeln—disquieted him? Perhaps Derrida felt that Lacan’s translation of Heidegger’s “Logos” was just another case of the psychoanalytic postman gathering up the truth of desire and conducting it to its final destination, delivering the logos to the door of the École Freudienne? For even if, in Lacan’s view, the truth of desire is unconscious, is not the unconscious structured as a language? Everyone, it seems, except for Derrida, knows what language is.

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Nine. Final Signs of Life: Heidegger and Irigaray

David Farrell Krell Indiana University Press ePub

In chapters 6 and 7 some nonsense was uttered about a second history of being, a “more covert” history of ϕύσιϛ and ζωή. Evidently, such a second history of being, appealing as it does to a distinction between overt and covert, surreptitiously reverts to the first, which is based on the opposition of revealing and concealing, openness and closure. One would have to be both more careful and more reckless about such talk. More careful: a history of za-ology cannot simply be rattled off without the most painstaking research and reflection. If Heidegger took three or four decades (or five, or six) to elaborate the first, no one should expect less of the chronicler of the second. Guarantees against old age, decrepitude, and lifedeath would have to be written into the contract. More reckless: an other history of being, of being as ϕύσιϛ, but of ϕύσιϛ as ζωή, and of ζωή as ζά, might well have to cast off every pious appurtenance of Heideggerian Geschichte and Geschick, abjure every appeal to “essence” and “fateful sending,” renounce the comforts of epochality, propriety, and propriation, and overcome both the temptations of fundamental ontology and the blandishments of an ostensibly other thinking of beyng—or of its history. In short, such a second history of being would have to lose both history and being to anarchy. For as long as a history of being recounts the story of being as destinai, as a sending, the “suspension of epochal principles,” as Reiner Schürmann calls it, and calls for it, is a sometime thing. A truly an-archic thinking will occur only at the moments of interruption in any recounting of any history of being. A second history of being would therefore have to be ludic, and perhaps even ludicrous; it would have to persevere without face-saving strategies of any kind. Disarmed by life, as it were, in the way an adolescent is disarmed by love; without recourse, destined only to continue in the face of inevitable interruption.

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12. Luke 7:47

Kierkegaard, Søren Indiana University Press ePub

[ 12 ]

Lord Jesus Christ! You who certainly did not come to the world in order to judge,1 yet by being love that was not loved, you were a judgment upon the world. We call ourselves Christians, we say that we know no one to go to except you—alas, to whom should we then go2 when precisely by your love the judgment also comes upon us that we love little? To whom, oh hopelessness, if after all not to you; to whom, oh despair, if you really would not receive us mercifully, forgiving our great sin against you and against love, we who sinned much by loving little!

Attentive listener, at the altar the invitation, “come here all you who labor and are heavy laden, I will give you rest,”4 is indeed given. The single individual then accepts the invitation; he goes up to the altar. After that he comes back, leaving the altar—then there is another text, it could be inscribed over the church door inside, not to be read by those who are entering the church but only by those who are leaving the church, this text: “[the one] to whom little is forgiven loves little.” The first text is the altar’s invitation; the other is the altar’s justification, as if it were said there: “If at the altar you were not sensible of the forgiveness of your sins, every one of your sins, then it is due to yourself; the communion is without blame, the blame is yours, because you only loved little.” Oh, just as it is a difficult matter in praying rightly to be able to come to the Amen—for the one who has never prayed it seems easy enough, easy enough to be finished quickly; but for the one who felt a need to pray and began to pray, it surely has happened that it continually seemed to him as if he had something more upon his heart, as if he could neither get everything said nor get it all said as he wished it said, and thus he does not get to the Amen—likewise it is also a difficult matter rightly to receive the forgiveness of sins at the altar. There the gracious forgiveness of all your sins is pledged to you. If you hear it rightly, take the forgiveness of all your sins quite literally, then you will be able to go away from the altar, divinely understood, as light of heart as a newborn child, upon whom nothing, nothing weighs heavily, thus even lighter of heart insofar as much has weighed upon your heart. At the altar there is no one who would spare you even the least of your sins, no one—if you yourself do not do it. So cast them all away from you; and the recollection of them—lest you retain them in that; and the recollection of having thrown them away—lest you retain them within yourself in that. Cast it all away from you; you have nothing at all to do except, believing, to cast away from yourself and to cast away from yourself what weighs heavily and burdens. What could be easier! Ordinarily the difficult thing is to have to take burdens upon oneself, but to dare, to have to cast away from oneself! And yet how difficult! Yes, even rarer than the one who shouldered all burdens, even rarer is the one who accomplished the apparently very easy task, after having received the assurance of the gracious forgiveness of his sins and the pledge of it, of feeling entirely relieved of every—even the least sin, or of every—even the greatest sin! If you could peer into hearts you would no doubt see how many go up to the altar burdened, groaning under the heavy burden; and when they then leave there, if you could peer into hearts you would possibly see that basically there was not a single one who went away entirely relieved, and sometimes you would perhaps see that there was one who went away even more burdened, burdened by the thought that he surely had not been a worthy guest at the altar since he found no relief.

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2: Light and Dark

Ó Murchadha, Felix Indiana University Press ePub

DESIRE, BEYOND NEED, articulates itself in the intersection of light and dark. Such articulation expresses the self-understanding of existence. In vocation existence understands its being-called as personal or impersonal, as self-affirmation in transcendence or as self-annihilation in immanence—as ecstasis or depression. Here, metaphysical desire conflicts with transcendent desire—desire for world with desire for that which disrupts the world. The visible glory against the glory of the invisible.

Metaphysical desire journeys from a sensual light through a certain darkness to light as its own source, a journey expressed paradigmatically in Plato's allegory of the cave. Philosophies of enlightenment find their historical starting point and their abiding topology in this allegory. It structures the relation of humanity to divinity across theistic, deistic, and atheistic understandings: Darkness as the absence of light; light as the shining forth of a central radiance.1 Hierarchies of being, teleologies of knowledge, desire of goodness and truth all radiate around a spiraling journey toward the light: light as the source of being and of knowledge. But behind such accounts stands the figure of fire, the source of light robbed from the gods of the sky by a god of the earth (Prometheus), all-consuming, ultimately blinding, destructive of being and knowledge. In this ambivalence of light lies the anxiety of metaphysics, driving toward that which is beyond human capacity in the name of the inhuman, divine animating principle of non-earthly knowledge. The ultimate struggle of metaphysics is not between body and soul, material and immaterial, but rather between the earthly and the celestial, the soil beneath and the sky above. The human is a being of the earth but directed toward the sky; hence the human fascination with birds and flight (from Icarus to space travel) indicates its ultimate ambitions and metaphysical goals.

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Three: Beyond Distress: Toward a Community of Memory

James Risser Indiana University Press ePub

What if one were to look for a “solution” to the plight of journeying, the distress in the constant venture of the foreign, in the life of understanding? To do so would not be to remove the venture of the foreign from the operation of hermeneutics, but only to bring into view what in an everyday way occurs in relation to the home, namely, human community. From the perspective of a certain sensibility within the Greek experience of the world, a perspective brought to our attention in Sophocles’s Antigone, keeping the human community within view would amount to keeping human life from becoming ignoble (μ καλòν).1 What this means, though, is not immediately clear to the reader of Sophocles’s play, especially the reader who has also read Heidegger’s interpretation of the first choral ode of the play, where this sensibility is expressed.2 Staying more faithful to the text, this matter of the “nobility” of life that coincides with community is certainly not the grandeur of domestication. It is not, in other words, the grandeur of the rule of law that brings the order of life into view. It is rather precisely what Heidegger, despite the excessiveness of his interpretation, pays attention to, namely, the beautiful strangeness (δειvόv) of human life—the beautiful strange power that is a human life. But what is this strangeness? In variance with Heidegger’s reading of the strophe from Sophocles, the strangeness of the human—the strangeness in relation to which there is wonder and admiration—is not simply a designation for the uncanniness of the human, for this only tells us that the human is constantly unsettled. Reading the strophe from Sophocles in the context of the play, we learn that the human is designated as strange precisely because he has the capacity to create, and this capacity to create, as an essential determination of the human, is more than an ability for the production of artifacts. It is primarily an ability for a different kind of making, the making that occurs in being a being who is never helpless before its future.3 It is creation as self-creation—the bringing of a human life into its very being. Put differently, the marvelous power of a human life is that it can form itself, bring itself into a formation that is at once the formation of the polis. The chorus sings of this creation at the beginning of the strophe in question: the human “has taught himself speech and wind-like thoughts and the impulse for the laws of governing (κα φθέγμα κα νεμόεν φρόνημα κα στυνόμους ργς διδξατο).”4 One could perhaps say that in this self-teaching (διδξατο), the human is not just most strange but also most daring, for here it is a matter of a different venture, the venture of bringing the order of life into view, the order of life that is inseparable from the impulse for giving order to the polis.

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5. [On Framing Philosophical Theories]

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF


[On Framing Philosophical Theories] late Spring 1890

Houghton Library

Three questions, at least, I think it must be admitted, ought to form the subject of studies preliminary to the formation of any philosophical st nd theory; namely, 1 , the purpose of the theory, 2 , the proper method of rd discovering it, 3 , the method of proving it to be true. I think, too, it can hardly be denied that it will be safer to consider these questions concerning the particular theory which is to be sought out, in the light of whatever we can ascertain regarding the functions, the discovery, and the establishment of sound theories in general. But these are questions of logic; and thus, no matter whether we ultimately decide to rest our philosophy upon logical principles as data, or upon psychological laws, or upon physical observations, or upon mystical experiences, or upon intuitions of first principles, or testimony, in any event these logical questions have to be considered first.

But if logic is thus to precede philosophy, will it not be unphilosophical logic? Perhaps logic is not in much need of philosophy. Mathematics, which is a species of logic, has never had the least need of philosophy in doing its work. Besides, even if logic should require subsequent remodelling in the light of philosophy, yet the unphilosophical logic with which we are obliged to set out will surely be better than no logic at all.

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7. Metanoetics: The Seventh Day, or Making All Things New

John D. Caputo Indiana University Press ePub

Abba of ours in heaven,
let your name be hallowed,
let your rule come,
let your will be brought about,

We might, as a kind of artistic ruse or authorial conceit, think of Part One of this book as having devoted its time to the first week of creation, while Part Two turns its attention to our everyday life in the world God made, to the “eventiveness” of all the days that follow after that very eventful and famous first week. We might also think that while the first half commented on the book of Genesis, the second part is dedicated to a kind of commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, which is a venerable theological tradition to which I will make a peculiarly deconstructive contribution. To carry this conceit to an extreme, the “Interlude” may be seen as a commentary on the “Angelus” (the impossible) and the “Magnificat” (hyper-realism). To be sure, my contributions are of such irregular and modest proportions that they may very well be returned to me in the mail by the authorities, who might on the whole think themselves better served without them, a judgment for which I cannot entirely fault them.

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Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF
Medium 9780253021076

6 Meaning and the Individual

Yang Guorong Indiana University Press ePub

GROUNDED IN THE historical process of accomplishing oneself and accomplishing things, a world of meaning may take shape into different forms. Whether it is exhibited internally in the form of ideas or unfolds externally into humanized reality, a world of meaning is always inseparable from the being of humans. Now, when considering the relation between the being of humans and a world of meaning, the individual or the person is an important aspect that cannot be ignored, because a world of meaning is first opened up and presented to the concrete individual or person. At a much broader level, the being of the individual possesses some sort of ontological priority: accomplishing oneself in the social sphere is likewise the concern of a specific individual. As a historical process, accomplishing things and accomplishing oneself and the consequent genesis of a world of meaning concerns the being of the individual at both the metaphysical and social level. Therefore, it is impossible to dodge the problem of the individual in a concrete consideration of a world of meaning.

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17. What Makes a Reasoning Sound? (1903)

Edited by the Peirce Edition Project Indiana University Press ePub


MSS 448–449. [Partly published in CP 1.591–610 (MS 448), 1.611–15 and 8. 176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave at the Lowell Institute in Boston under the general title “Some Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now Vexed.”] In this lecture, Peirce refutes “a malady” that “has broken out in science,” namely the idea then in vogue that rationality rests on a feeling of logicality, and that it is futile to try to find an objective distinction between good and bad reasoning. On the contrary, Peirce claims, that distinction is not at all a matter of what we approve of, but is a question of fact. Good reasoning is based on a method that “tends to carry us toward the truth more speedily than we could otherwise progress.Peirce discusses the significance of even a slight tendency to guess correctly, arguing that, given the right method, that is all that is required to assure progress toward the truth. He continues the argument, first made in the Harvard Lectures, that reasoning is a form of controlled conduct, and thus has an ethical dimension. Peirce concludes with a discussion of the scope of logic, which he now equates with semiotics as a whole.

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6. 1 John 3:20

Kierkegaard, Søren Indiana University Press ePub

[ 6 ]

Great are you, O God; although we only know you as in a mystery and as in a mirror,1 we still adore your greatness in wonder—how much more must we one day extol it when we learn to know it more fully! When I stand under the dome of heaven surrounded by the wonder of creation, then moved and with adoration I praise your greatness, you who easily support the stars eternally and concern yourself in a fatherly manner with the sparrow.2 But when we are gathered here in your holy house, then we are also surrounded on all sides by what in a deeper sense reminds us of your greatness. For great are you, the Creator and Sustainer of the world; but when you, O God, forgave the world’s sin and reconciled yourself with the fallen human race, ah, then you were indeed even greater in your incomprehensible compassion! How could we then not believingly praise and thank and worship you here in your holy house, where everything reminds us of this, especially those who are gathered today to receive the forgiveness of sins and to appropriate anew reconciliation with you in Christ!

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Conclusion: Comedy, Subjectivity, and the Negative

Peter Wake Indiana University Press ePub


Comedy, Subjectivity, and the Negative

Ohne ihn gelesen zu haben, läßt sich kaum wissen, wie dem Menschen sauwohl sein kann.

—Hegel on Aristophanes (W 15:553)

In the Phenomenology, “the revealed religion,” Christianity, is not a failed tragedy as is the case in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate. By 1807, Christianity is presented as the fulfillment of the religious forms found in ancient Greece. What has happened in the interim? How do we explain this conversion, or inversion (Umkehrung)?1 Whereas Hegel presents Christianity in Frankfurt as die ungeheure Verbindung (a monstrous combination) over which “millions of God-seeking souls have fought and tormented themselves” (W 1:409–410/SC 293), he now sees Jesus as “a tragic hero translated from the stage into real life.”2 As a clue to the reason this transformation takes place, we might consider the fact that the movement from “the spiritual work of art” of Greece to “the revealed religion” passes through comedy as the sublation of tragedy. If, as Hegel discovers in Frankfurt, beauty is tragic and tragic beauty is not only the presentation of life but its dissolution as well, “religion in the form of art” must also be the art of its own dissolution. This occurs in the laughter of comedy. Hegel writes in the Lectures on Fine Art that comedy—as opposed to the laughter of derision, scorn and despair—implies “an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised altogether above his own inner contradiction…: this is the bliss and ease of a man who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustration of his aims and achievements” (W 15:528/LFA 1200).

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