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Medium 9780253007865

7 “Pure” versus “Impure” Experience: Examples of Pure Experience

William J. Gavin Indiana University Press ePub

The question of the availability of pure experience leads directly to the issue of language and to James’s ambivalence about language. The question of the availability of pure experience also constitutes the latent content of Essays in Radical Empiricism (ERE) and A Pluralistic Universe (PU). Let us take up the issue of language first. There actually exist two different views on language in the Jamesian texts. One of these is disparaging toward language, but the second is more positive in nature.

The first position is the one most readily identified with James, and it is scattered throughout his works. In The Principles of Psychology (PP), for example, he states that

language works against our perception of the truth. We name our thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each knew its own thing and nothing else. What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with dimly perhaps a thousand other things.1

Here James argues that we take language too much for granted. We all assume that each word has one meaning and that, when the word is used in “x” number of sentences, the meaning is the same. Language so taken, he asserts, is inadequate to the substantive and transitive parts of the stream of consciousness. The sheer inadequacy of language to describe the nuances of the stream is brought out by James in PP. Having asserted that relations between things are real, both in the existent order of events and in the stream of consciousness, he continues,

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Medium 9780253343635

Seminar in Le Thor 1968

Heidegger, Martin ePub

August 30

This is the first session of the seminar. Consequently, Heidegger begins with a general remark on the work of the seminar. There can be no authority, since we work in common. We work in order to reach the matter itself [Sache selbst] which is in question. Thus the matter itself is the sole authority. On the basis of the text in question, the issue is to touch, and be touched by, the matter itself. The text is therefore ever only a means, not an end.

In our case, the issue is Hegel: we must therefore begin a confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with Hegel, so that Hegel speaks to us. To let him speak for himself, and not to correct what Hegel has to say with what we know. In this way alone can one prevent the danger of personal interpretation.

This is why, in a genuine seminar, the teacher is the one who learns the most. For this, it is not required that he instruct the others what the text means, but instead that he listen rightly to the text.

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Medium 9780253010445

4 The Nature of Nature

Shane Montgomery Ewegen Indiana University Press ePub

Just after indicating the ridiculous character of Cratylus's comments regarding Hermogenes’ name, and after he has reiterated the difficulty and danger of the inquiry to come, Socrates says that he and Hermogenes must now investigate (σκοπεν) in common (εἰς τò κοινòν) into whether Cratylus or Hermogenes is right about the correctness of names (384c). Hermogenes then elaborates upon his previously stated position that naming is a matter of human convention and agreement:

[I]t seems to me [ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκε] that whatever name anyone gives [θται] to anything is the correct one [τò ỏρθóν]; and if one then changes it to something else, and no longer calls it that other name, the later one is no less correct than the earlier one. It's the same way as we change the names of our slaves, for no name is of such a nature [πεφυκέναι] as to belong to any particular thing by nature [φύσει], but only by the custom and habit [νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει] of those who set it down [ἐθισάντων] and call it that [καλούντων]. (384d–e; Sachs; trans. modified)

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Medium 9780253013835

6 Between Deconstruction and Speculation: John D. Caputo and A/Theological Materialism

Clayton Crockett Indiana University Press ePub

Katharine Sarah Moody

WHEN RADICAL ORTHODOXY asserts that “only transcendence . . . ‘suspends’ ” the material in the sense of “upholding [its] relative worth over-against the void,” both John D. Caputo and Slavoj Žižek suspect that matter is not what ultimately matters for John Milbank.1 Within what Caputo calls “the soft Gnosticism” of “strong” theologies such as Radical Orthodoxy, the spirit is in the flesh but not of the flesh. Desiring to escape materiality and reach union with God, Milbank’s is a theology of in-carnation rather than of carnality, and Caputo identifies this tendency in Milbank’s materialism, which operates within an economy of “bodies without flesh” where “matter does not have the last word.”2 A Radically Orthodox materialism cannot, thereby, fully affirm the material in all its goodness, a “good” that Caputo finds at the heart of fleshy material life and at the heart of the Christian creation narratives and kingdom parables. Similarly, for Žižek, Milbank’s theological materialism leads to “standard metaphysics” wherein “material reality isn’t everything, there is another, higher spiritual reality.” There is a constitutive exception to materiality—a transcendence that grounds it. According to Žižek, therefore, the “true formula of materialism” is not that material reality is (or is not) all there is but that material reality is not-all, is non-all. While there is nothing that does not belong to the material, the field of the material is never an All, never a One; it is lacking, contradictory and conflicted, nontotalized, containing an inherent antagonism that is the possibility of subjectivity, freedom, and revolution.3

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Medium 9780946439980

10 August 1959

Wilfred R. Bion Karnac Books ePub

Dream-work-α

Under the title dream-work-α I propose to bring together a number of mental activities all of which are familiar to practising psycho-analysts, although they may not have previously associated them together in this way and may not indeed feel the need or value of associating them in the way I propose after they have familiarized themselves with what I am about to say.

The title, ‘dream-work’, has already a meaning of great value. I wish to extend some of the ideas already associated with it and to limit others. It has seemed to me least likely to cause confusion if I group my ideas under a new title which indicates the affiliations of my ideas and yet makes clear that a distinction is being proposed from the theories already grouped under the term, ‘dream-work’.

The main sources, other than the stimulations of psycho-analytical practice and historical affiliations of these grouped ideas, are three-fold.

(1)    Freud's Interpretation of Dreams [1900a, SE 4, 5] and especially the elaboration of his theories of dream-work.

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Medium 9780253329653

10. Defenseless

Daniel HowardSnyder Indiana University Press ePub

BRUCE RUSSELL

Evidential arguments from evil against the existence of God often take the following form:

1. If God exists, there is no gratuitous evil, that is, evil which God would have no morally sufficient reason to allow.

2. But there is gratuitous evil.

3. So God does not exist.

They are evidential because of the nature of the arguments given for the second premise. Those arguments are probabilistic or epistemic in nature, starting from the fact that even after careful reflection we see no morally sufficient reason for God to allow certain kinds, instances, amounts, or patterns of suffering or from that suffering itself. And they move from those starting points to the conclusion that there is gratuitous evil either by induction or by abduction, that is, by an inference to the best explanation. We can capture these four kinds of evidential arguments from evil by means of the following matrix:

William Rowe has given a version of the evidential argument from evil that is in category (1). He argues that because the goods we know of provide no morally sufficient reason for allowing certain instances of suffering, we have good reason to believe that no goods provide such reason and hence good reason to believe that allowing the suffering is not morally justified. Critics have responded that our knowledge that the goods we know of do not justify allowing the suffering gives us reason to believe that no goods do only if we have good reason to believe that the sample of goods we know of is a representative sample, and we have no good reason to believe it is.2 An argument that has been given to show we have no reason to believe the sample is representative is that “goods beyond our ken have no chance of belonging to Rowe’s sample [of goods which could justify allowing the suffering]; so the sample is not random.”3

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Medium 9780253356710

Chapter Thirty-four. Husserl’s Investigation of the Unitary Domain of Formal Logic and Formal Ontology in Formal and Transcendental Logic

Burt C. Hopkins Indiana University Press ePub

We have already seen that Husserl is quite explicit about Formal and Transcendental Logic’s reliance upon the Prolegomena’s formulation of the relationship between formal mathematics and formal logic, a formulation that the former work characterizes as unsurpassable. The idea taken up in the former is that of building a “full and entire mathesis universalis” (FTL, 87) in which formal mathematics appears as “the highest level of logical analytics” (86), an idea that is rooted in Husserl’s characterization of the unitary province of formal mathematics and formal (analytical) logic as that of ‘anything whatever’. But unlike the Prolegomena, where this idea remains undeveloped, in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl begins to articulate the concrete steps necessary for its development. And he does so by focusing on a problem that “is not yet propounded in the Logical Investigations” (75), the “problem of the relationship between formal ontology and apophantic logic.”

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Medium 9780253017437

12 Reflections regarding Good and Evil: The Complexity of Words in Zanzibar

William C Olsen Indiana University Press ePub

KJERSTI LARSEN

For it was safer to have that terrible frightening force held in a shape associated with the mythical or the magical, than loose, or as it were at large, in a person, and in a person who had the power to move me.

DORIS LESSING

This essay addresses the moral category of evil from an anthropological perspective. For that reason I shall explore “evil” from a particular ontology rather than as a universal concept. This is the only approach that could disclose understandings that may challenge the dominant emic Judeo-Christian theological or philosophical framework. Investigating the manner in which evil is embedded in cosmologies of the everyday, I shall pay attention to practice including discourse as, within this domain, it would only rarely be elaborated in any abstract mode. Furthermore, being attentive to how evil is perceived and identified through its practice renders possible a discussion of its potentially different shapes and divergent qualities. The epigraph from Doris Lessing (1973, 479) is precisely chosen because it conceptualizes evil not as an exclusive category external to society, but as a force made part of personhood and activated in human relationships. Inspired by this insight, my aim is to explore the manner in which evil would be sensed and conceptualized in a Zanzibari, Swahili lifeworld. By exploring the dynamics of evil and what it opposes to, I shall focus on questions relating to how evil is perceived, lived, and enacted, the ways in which evil is identified and how its presence impacts daily life routines and human relationships. The exploration is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Zanzibar Town, including both Stone Town or Old Town (Mji Mkongwe) and its suburbs (ng’ambo) from 1984 until the present. The women and men I have worked with belong to different communities and economic categories, they are all Sunni Muslims and thus, Islam and Islamic teachings are incorporated into their everyday lives. With the aspiration of being good Muslims, most would understand and negotiate their lifestyle and activities with reference to the Quran and the Hadith as well as to translations provided by local religious scholars (walimu and mashehe). Not claiming reference to any particular theological position, approaching evil as well as encounters associated with potential malice within a Zanzibari cosmology of the everyday, I will thus be focusing on practice and the colloquial discourse, including terms, concepts, and conditions associated with harm.

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Medium 9781934989111

Chapter 18: Karma

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9780253006196

6. Foucault’s Reconstruction of Modern Moralities: An Ethics of Self-Transformation

Colin Koopman Indiana University Press ePub

6

Foucault’s Reconstruction of Modern Moralities

An Ethics of Self-Transformation

Foucault’s Responsive Ethics

In the later years of his foreshortened life, Foucault began to elaborate a conception of ethics that might have functioned as a serious alternative to the behemoth moral systems that have thoroughly dominated the ethical practices of our modernity. Foucault in this work was doing nothing less than challenging the past few centuries of modern moral philosophy and the dominant forms of moral practice that philosophy has aimed to systematize and sustain. As I have described Foucault’s problematizations of modernity in Discipline and Punish and History of Madness, a core tension constitutive of our practices of modernity involves the problematization of the purification of power and freedom. It is from our perspective within this problematization that we find it incredibly difficult to determine if our actions are exercises of self-constraint (the exercise of power) or of self-constitution (the exercise of freedom). It is in response to this problematization that Foucault sought to elaborate the possibility for alternative ethical practices in which power and freedom would no longer be parceled out—for example, in their familiar forms of discipline and liberation—but would rather be integrated as a simultaneous practice of the co-transformation of powers and freedoms. In a summary account of his 1981 Collège de France lecture course titled “Subjectivity and Truth,” Foucault offered this striking description of his future research plans: “The history of the ‘care’ and the ‘techniques’ of the self would thus be a way of doing the history of subjectivity; no longer, however, through the divisions between the mad and the non-mad, the sick and the non-sick, the delinquents and the non-delinquents … but, rather, through the putting in place, and transformations in our culture, of ‘relations with oneself.’”1 In the face of purification and against it, Foucault sought to elaborate an alternative ethics of the transformation of ourselves.

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Medium 9780253372055

[STUDY OF GREAT MEN]

Peirce, Charles S. PDF

27

Study of Great Men, 1883-84

First Rank

38

39

40

41

42

Caesar

Columbus

PConfucius

Copernicus

Cromwell

68 Dante

76 Euler

Provisionally

Admitted

Calderon

.Calvin

Camoens

.Cauchy

Cellini

Cervantes

IChampollion

ICharlemagne

Charles Martel

Charles XII

PChasles

PChaucer

Chrysostom

.Cid

.Clive

Colbert

PPComte

???Charlotte

Corday

60 Cuvier

61 Cyrus

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

69

71

72

70

73

74

IDarwin

King David

Democritus

IDescartes

De Witt

Diirer

77 ?Geo. Eliot

78 X Queen

Elizabeth

?-R. W. Emerson

Epaminondas

79 Epicurus

80 Euclid

81 Euripides

62

63

64

65

66

67

Canova

Carlyle

ICavour X

Cecil

Charles V X

Chopin

= Cicero X

Coleridge

Constantine X

= Captain

Cooke X

Cortes X

Coulomb

Admirable

Crichton

Dalton

=Danton

= Darius

266 Sir Humphrey 75

Davy X

Deschapelles X

267 Diez X

Dirichlet

88 =Farragut X

= Froissart

91 Galen

92 Garibaldi

Vasco da Gama

Garcilaso de la

Vega

100 '.Gladstone X

Gluck

Godefroi

??-D. Garrick

93 Germanicus

94 PGilbert

95 PGiotto

Provisionally

xcluded

Cleopatra

280 Clausius

Dickens

Diderot

Dryden

75 Drake

Ehrcnberg

82 (Erasmus X

Erigena van Eyck

??Fabricius

Faraday

.Fichte

B. Franklin

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Medium 9780253013958

4 Natural Play, Natural Metaphor, and Natural Stories: Biosemiotic Realism

Serenella Iovino Indiana University Press ePub

Wendy Wheeler

It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,—not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as “the truth,”—that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.

—Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative
Sciences”

Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs . . . because we have a prior commitment . . . to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but . . . that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations. . . . Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

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Medium 9780253006714

6. The Concreteness and Continuity of Faith

Brian Gregor Indiana University Press ePub

In chapter 5 we saw how the self is constituted through the address of an external word, which gives the self its point of unity (Einheitspunkt). But if the self is constituted in the event of being addressed, how does the self have continuity from moment to moment? Does this event have any concrete extension in the life of the self, or does this account lead in the direction of an actualistic or punctual (Pünktlich) self?

Charles Taylor uses the term “punctual self” to describe the highly influential modern assumption that the self is pointlike in nature, with no extension in space, time, or corporeality. The punctual self is a disengaged consciousness, defined by its power to objectify external reality through its epistemic acts and to remake this reality through practical activity. This self is pointlike because it is really “nowhere”; it exercises these powers remotely,1 and in its most extreme form the punctual self defines itself entirely through its acts, which are unconditioned by any ontological claims regarding the way things are apart from these acts.

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Medium 9780253012487

6. Remaining with the Decolonial Turn: Race and the Limits of the Social-Political Historical Critique in Latin American Thought

Alejandro Arturo Vallega Indiana University Press ePub

Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man.

—Frantz Fanon

To think in the interstices of the Modern project’s crisis, such is the task of a critical ontology of the present.

—Santiago Castro-Gómez

Philosophy has always insisted upon this: thinking its other. . . . To insist upon thinking its other: its proper other, the proper of its other, an other proper? In thinking it as such, in recognizing it, one misses it. One reappropriates it for oneself, one disposes of it, one misses it, or rather one misses (the) missing (of) it, which as concerns the other, always amounts to the same.

—Jacques Derrida

In this chapter I revisit Quijano’s analysis critically, in order to underline some of the difficulties that come with his historical materialist critique of Western modernity, difficulties that I believe ultimately may undermine the very attempt to the decolonization of consciousness and thought that his analysis intends. My aim is to point toward the possibility for another way of thinking that may contribute to the decoloniality of thought and to the unfolding of philosophies today. This way of thinking takes its departure from a Latin American experience that no longer fits the attempts to establish a place for Latin America within the scope of Western modern rationalism and its self-criticism. As I conclude, Latin America marks a spacing, a difference, that is neither outside nor inside modern Western rationalism and that cannot be understood as the negativity that calls for a new rationalist theory of dialectical or historical materialist critique. This is because Latin America ultimately plays out the slipping, the undoing, of Western modern thought in concrete terms by virtue of its inoperative and interruptive play within Western modernity, history, and the Western project of human freedom under the infinite production of capital.1 This does not mean that the question of human freedom must be abandoned; on the contrary, the question remains to be thought in light of distinct and radical exteriority (in this case, Latin America’s), at the limit of its doing and undoing throughout modernity.

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Medium 9780253211859

General Propositions, Kinds, and Classes (1936)

Larry A Hickman Indiana University Press ePub

In an earlier article I called attention to the fact that Mill stated that since abstract terms are sometimes singular and sometimes general, it might be better to put them in a “class apart.” I argued that this class apart was that of universal if-then propositions; abstract terms being, when they have logical import, the content of such propositions. I stated that confusion has arisen in logical theory because such propositions are not definitely and consistently marked off from propositions that are general in the sense of generic, that is, referring to kinds, the latter being designated linguistically by common nouns instead of abstract nouns. I added that “contemporary logical writings are full of the confusion of the generic (general) and the universal, in spite of the common nominal recognition of the ambiguity of all.”1I propose here to illustrate this last statement as a means of effecting recognition of a difference in logical form between two kinds of propositions both of which are termed general.2

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