1388 Chapters
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4. Queer Beauty: Winckelmann and Kant on the Vicissitudes of the Ideal

PEG Z BRAND Indiana University Press ePub

WHITNEY DAVIS

Uranists often ornament their apartments with pictures and statues representing good-looking youths. It appears that they love the statue of Apollo Belvedere in a manner all their own.

—Albert Moll, Perversions of the Sex Instinct

The history of modern and contemporary art provides many examples of the “queering” of cultural and social norms. It has been tempting to consider this process of subversion and transgression, or “outlaw representation” (as Richard Meyer has called it), as well as related performances of “camp” or other gay inflections of the dominant forms of representation, to be the most creative mode of queer cultural production.1 Whether or not this is true in the history of later nineteenth- and twentieth-century art, we can identify a historical process in modern culture that has worked in the opposite direction—namely, the constitution of aesthetic ideals, cultural norms that claim validity within an entire society, which have been based on manifestly homoerotic prototypes and significances. There has been little subversion or camp in these configurations. Indeed, perhaps there has been a surfeit of idealizing configuration and normalizing representation. But as Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s art history and Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics might suggest, such idealization can be no less queer than camp inflections or outlaw representations.

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Medium 9780253211859

Voluntarism and the Roycean Philosophy (1916) (on Josiah Royce)

LARRY A HICKMAN Indiana University Press ePub

I am not about to inflict upon you a belated discovery that voluntarism is an integral factor in the Roycean theory of knowledge. Were it not obvious of itself, we have the emphatic utterances of Professor Royce himself in his address to this Association twelve years ago. Following a clue in that paper, it is my purpose to present some considerations relative to the relationship of voluntarism and intellectual-ism1 in the earliest phase of Mr. Royce’s published philosophy, thinking that the matter has historic interest and that it involves points relevant to forming a critical judgment of his later developments. Let me begin by quoting Mr. Royce upon his own early attitude. In 1881 he wrote a paper in which he “expressed a sincere desire to state the theory of truth wholly in terms of an interpretation of our judgments as present acknowledgments, since it made these judgments the embodiments of conscious attitudes that I then conceived to be essentially ethical and to be capable of no restatement in terms of any absolute warrant whatever.” And, referring to his change of views in the last respect, he says: “I am still of the opinion that judging is an activity guided by essentially ethical motives. I still hold that, for any truth seeker, the object of his belief is also the object of his will to believe.… I still maintain that every intelligent soul, however weak or confused, recognizes no truth except that which intelligently embodies its own present purpose.”2 The statement is explicit. Taken in connection with the earlier position, it arouses curiosity as to the reasons for the transition from subordination of intellect to will to the reversed position.

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Medium 9780253012241

3 Tilting the Ethical Lens: Shame, Disgust, and the Body in Question

Ellen K. Feder Indiana University Press ePub

Whom do you call bad? —One who always wants to put to shame.

What do you consider most humane? —to spare someone shame.

What is the seal of liberation? —No longer being ashamed in front of oneself.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Over the Last fifty years, people with atypical sex anatomies have been objects of intense medical scrutiny. The term “intersex” encompasses a wide variety of conditions, the common feature of which involves some expression of sexual ambiguity: an intersex body’s appearance doesn’t match its karyotype or its sex of assignment; external genitalia or gonads are not distinctively male or female; or sex chromosomes are atypical in some fashion—there’s an “extra” or missing X or Y, or even, though more rarely, a mosaic of chromosomes that includes a whole variety of combinations.1

The treatment protocols for infants and children with intersex conditions—which have frequently involved cosmetic genital surgery and sometimes sex reassignment—were originally formalized by psychologist John Money in the 1950s. For Money and his collaborators, “the problem” of intersex was the incongruence between the “biological sex” (which could be a confusing matter in cases of hermaphroditism) and what they called “gender role,” the combination of one’s social presentation and individual identity as masculine or feminine. Surgical intervention and hormone therapy, they argued, could facilitate this congruence. In their view, early intervention was necessary to ensure the consistent socialization—particularly with regard to parents’ certainty about their child’s sex of assignment—that would avert the “psychological disturbance” for which children would otherwise purportedly be at risk (Money 1955; quoted in Karkazis 2008, 55).

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Medium 9780253337894

XI The Thick Autonomy of Memory

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

As those mysterious beings in ancient tales rise from the ocean’s bed invested with seaweed, so [your innermost thought] now rises from the sea of remembrance, interwoven with memories.

—Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. I

 

 

At this late point in an increasingly demanding project we need to perform our own act of anamnesis lest amnesia set in. We have come a long way from the moment of departure in chapter 1—when brief, straightforward analyses of a few first-hand experiences of remembering sufficed to get things underway. We have come a long way, too, from the self-assurance that accompanied the application of an intentionalist model of mind to memory, not to mention the comparative ease of picking out conspicuous eidetic traits of remembering. Since then, matters have become considerably more complex. We have had to confront the many ways in which we remember in media vita, in the very thick of things. This is why we undertook a trajectory in Part Two that drew us not just into the past world of the remembered but decisively into the life-world of the rememberer. To take such memorial phenomena as reminding or recognizing seriously is to be thrust into the particularities of the perceptual world—just as reflection on the nature of reminiscing lands us squarely in the domain of the communal and the discursive. Still more dramatically, we found ourselves caught up in Part Three in circumstances of growing difficulty and diversity as we explored the roles of body and place in remembering, reaching a climax in a consideration of commemorating that had to account for such disparate factors as text, ritual, and intrapsychic identification. By the end of chapter 10, a situation had been reached in which any pretense of providing a merely formal treatment, especially as measured in the classical phenomenological terms with which the book commenced, had to be given up. At that point, “ecstasy” (i.e., literally “standing outside” oneself) had become just as constitutive as anything “encompassing” (i.e., being surrounded in a comfortably comprehensive way).

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Medium 9780253012029

3. Acknowledging God

Espen Dahl Indiana University Press ePub

Having presented Cavell’s openness toward the problem of religion, I now proceed to more theologically charged territory in order to explore some possibilities offered by Cavell’s philosophy. In doing so, I focus on one of Cavell’s signature concepts, namely acknowledgment. Although acknowledgment has a wide application in Cavell’s thinking—including our relation to the world, others, different modernist artistic media, and our own conditions as speaking animals—it was initially developed in response to the skeptical problem of other minds. Since the problem of other minds has remained at the center of Cavell’s concerns, and since this problem highlights features relevant to related inflections of that concept, I first outline acknowledgment as it is developed in that context. To be precise, it is within the context of a discussion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument that Cavell first proposes this concept. In addition to its centrality to Cavell’s thinking on the whole, the reason for focusing on this concept in the present chapter is that it has clear implications for the conception of the self’s relation to God.

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Medium 9780856832574

Half_Title

Arthur Farndell Shepheard-Walwyn ePub
Medium 9780253012821

6 City of Lights

John Sallis Indiana University Press ePub

 

Paris

May

These are days when the sky is pure light spreading its gift across the expanse of the city, casting its luminous splendor on the boulevards and the monuments, the gardens and the palaces. On such days the light shines with such intensity that it actually produces the opposite of its usual effect, assuming the guise of a gift that in being given also takes back a certain measure of what it bestows. Instead of making things visible, it renders them virtually invisible; they come to be wrapped in light, enshrouded by it, concealed. In the very midst of things there appear blank spaces in which only the resplendent sunlight is to be seen, ellipses of visibility that are neither simply visible nor simply invisible. These intervals of excessive luminosity repel sustained vision; they yield only to the momentary glance. The light that conceals, that renders things invisible rather than making them visible, proves so elusive that it virtually conceals itself. Ever so fleeting, this luminous concealment borders on utter self-concealment.

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Medium 9781934989142

VI. Krishnamurti: His Heuristic Approach

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9780253011688

4 Reproaching Heaven and Serving Heaven in the Mèngzǐ

Franklin Perkins Indiana University Press ePub

THE MÒZǏ AND Dàodéjīng both claim that we share common goals and that following the regular patterns of nature allows us to effectively reach them. In this sense, both can be seen as opposing the fatalism that developed near the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, restoring a model analogous to the early Zhōu doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. The disorder and suffering of the times, however, suggested that the fit between heaven and human was not so neat. Given the condition of the world, good people might not want to follow its patterns—they might even feel the need to oppose it. Although the Mòzǐ and Dàodéjīng at least aim toward the harmony or unity of heaven and human (tiānrén héyī), the conditions of the time pointed more toward recognizing their division (tiānrén zhīfēn). We have already seen the outlines of such a position in the fatalistic tendency among some of the early Ru. Mèngzǐ’s philosophy can be seen as a more complex and developed account of this position, primarily adding two dimensions. One is a detailed account of human motivation in terms of an analysis of xìng , our natural or characteristic tendencies and dispositions. The other is an attempt to shift the locus of our relationship with heaven away from the external patterns of nature and toward these natural dispositions that heaven gives us. Together, these two points allow Mèngzǐ to take the problem of evil more seriously than any other prominent Warring States philosopher, leaving him closest to something like a tragic worldview.

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Medium 9781907556579

4 Ball Tournament Fun Formats

Alan Hyde M-Y Books Ltd ePub

Chapter

5

To be played in 4 ball Team Tournaments

1.     Golden Ball Each player takes it in turn to be The Golden Ball that player must be one of the scores to count on that hole plus the best score of the other 3 players. The next hole the Golden Ball passes to the next player etc. This can be varied using Stroke play, Stableford scoring with or without Handicap allowances, as well as varying the number to score, i.e. Golden Ball plus 2 best scores of the other 3 players. Other variations include

2.     Snakes & Ladders All players start on the Yellow Tees. Score a nett birdie or better & that player moves back a Tee colour on the next hole. Score a nett par & that player stays on the same colour tees next hole. Score a nett bogey & that player moves forward a Tee colour on the next hole. (If you run out of tees then stay on the same colour). This can either be scored using Stroke Play, Stableford scoring and with or without Handicap allowances.

3.     No Bogeys Played under a modified Stableford scoring system with fixed score usually Par but can be anything the Tournament leader likes.

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Medium 9780253337894

Coda

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

The purpose of this Part has been to pursue memory beyond mind—or more exactly, to show that it is already beyond it. “Beyond” does not mean simply external to, much less triumphant over. Mind remains essential to human remembering; it continues to exhibit its importance in memorial matters—as we have just witnessed in the case of intrapsychic memorialization. And precisely because an activity like commemorating puts the body/mind dichotomy into suspension, it suggests that mentation continues to be deeply ingredient in memory even when a given act of remembering is not explicitly cogitative in character. Indeed, the rooting of the word “memory” in memor- (mindful)—and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and “reminiscing” in mens (mind)—bespeaks the same ingrediency, as does the striking fact that gemynd in Old English means equally “memory” or “mind.” If we are to move beyond mind in memory in the ways that have been explored in the preceding six chapters, we must not forget that mind always lies close behind memory. However withdrawn it may be as an origin, and however skeptical we may be as to its role in modern theories of memory, it is never altogether absent from the memorial life.

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Medium 9781934989159

The Ideal and the Actual

Jidda Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub

What we are going to do this evening, if we may, is to learn about this particular thing called consciousness. To learn about consciousness, obviously, you must come to it afresh. You may have read books, you may have ideas, opinions; what you have read, your opinions, your knowledge according to somebodyall that is not what is, is not the fact. To understand a fact, opinions are not necessary; on the contrary, they are a hindrance. And to inquire into this consciousness, one must be free, not bound to any particular theory or knowledge.

So the rst requirement of a serious human being who wants to learn is that he must be free to inquire, that means, not to be afraid: to be free to look, to observe, to criticize; to be intelligently sceptical, and not to accept opinions. We are going to inquire into something that demands all your attention, and you cannot attend if you have an opinion, an idea, a formula, or knowledge of what other people have said. As we said the other day, if you walk in the light of another, that light will lead you to darknessit does not matter who it is that offers the light. But to walk in the light of ones own understanding, that can only come about when there is attention and silence, and that demands a great deal of seriousness.

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Medium 9781934989128

To Change Society, You Must Break Away From It

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9780253372048

1. Read's Theory of Logic

Peirce, Charles S. Indiana University Press PDF

Read's Theory of Logic, 1879

1

Read's Theory of Logic1

P 148: Nation 28 (3 April 1879): 234-35

This work is the fruit of a travelling scholarship. But in all his travels the author seems never to have come across any modern logic, except in English. Three views, he observes, have been taken of logic; which, if limited to England, is true. Some writers consider it as a study of the operations of the understanding, thus bringing it into close relations with psychology. Others regard it as an analysis of the conditions which must be conformed to in the transformations of verbal expressions in order to avoid the introduction of falsehood.

While others again—our author among them—think the propositions of logic are facts concerning the things reasoned about.

There is certainly this to be said in favor of the last opinion, namely, that the question of the validity of any kind of reasoning is the question how frequently a conclusion of a certain sort will be true when premises of a certain sort are true; and this is a question of fact, of how things are, not of how we think. But, granted that the principles of logic are facts, how do they differ from other facts? For facts, in this view, should separate themselves into two classes, those of which logic itself takes cognizance and those which, if needed, have to be set up in the premises. It is just as if we were to insist that the principles of law were facts; in that case we should have to distinguish between the facts which the court would lay down and those which must be brought out in the testimony. What, then, are the facts which logic permits us to dispense with stating in our premises? Clearly those which may always be taken for granted: namely, those which we cannot consistently doubt, if reasoning is to go on at all; for example, all that is implied in the existence of doubt and of belief, and of the passage from one to the other, of truth and of falsehood,

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The Good of Activity from Human Nature and Conduct(1922)

LARRY A HICKMAN Indiana University Press ePub

Conduct when distributed under heads like habit, impulse and intelligence gets artificially shredded. In discussing each of these topics we have run into the others. We conclude, then, with an attempt to gather together some outstanding considerations about conduct as a whole.

The foremost conclusion is that morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a difference between better and worse arises. Reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better. The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good. Comparative and superlative degrees are only paths to the positive degree of action. The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. Until it is rejected, it is a competing good. After rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation.

Actually then only deliberate action, conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better and worse. Yet it is a perilous error to draw a hard and fast line between action into which deliberation and choice enter and activity due to impulse and matter-of-fact habit. One of the consequences of action is to involve us in predicaments where we have to reflect upon things formerly done as matter of course. One of the chief problems of our dealings with others is to induce them to reflect upon affairs which they usually perform from unreflective habit. On the other hand, every reflective choice tends to relegate some conscious issue into a deed or habit henceforth taken for granted and not thought upon. Potentially therefore every and any act is within the scope of morals, being a candidate for possible judgment with respect to its better-or-worse quality. It thus becomes one of the most perplexing problems of reflection to discover just how far to carry it, what to bring under examination and what to leave to unscrutinized habit. Because there is no final recipe by which to decide this question all moral judgment is experimental and subject to revision by its issue.

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