Results for: “Philosophy”
|Adil Hussain Khan||Indiana University Press||ePub|
2 The Prophetic Claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Primary and Secondary Claims
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s education and spiritual training shaped the way in which he understood and expressed his religious experiences. His spiritual claims were complex, with subtle nuances that developed over the course of his life, but the controversy surrounding his claims is in many ways what makes his mission most interesting. Any serious analysis of Ghulam Ahmad’s claims must account for changes in interpretation that have taken place over time. The expansion of these claims did not come to an end with Ghulam Ahmad’s death, but rather continued through successive generations of Ahmadi interpreters who framed and articulated these claims differently. The ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical nature of Ghulam Ahmad’s Sufi-style metaphysics has led to divergent opinions about him. His views on theological issues are often presented analytically, whereas in actuality they are difficult to assess. The controversial aspects of Ahmadi Islam are less a result of Ghulam Ahmad’s primary spiritual claims and more a result of consequential inferences from—or secondary implications of—what his primary claims seem to entail. The best example of this is the case of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood itself, which was, surprisingly, not one of his primary spiritual claims. Similarly, Ghulam Ahmad’s rejection of violent jihad and his insistence upon Jesus’s survival of crucifixion were consequences of his claim to be the promised messiah. To better understand Ghulam Ahmad’s mission and appreciate how he became a prophet of God, one must evaluate the religious background of his primary spiritual claims alongside what they entail.See All Chapters
|Krzysztof Ziarek||Indiana University Press||ePub|
Was ist dann, wenn das Seiende und dessen je nachgetragene Seiendheit (das Apriori) den Vorrang verliert? Dann ist das Seyn. Dann wandelt sich das “ist” und alle Sprache wesentlich.
—Heidegger, GA 66, 337
What happens then, when beings and the beingness (the a priori) that is always appended to them lose their preeminence? Then beyng is. Then, the “is” and all language transform themselves essentially.
—Heidegger, Mindfulness, 300–301 (modified)
The key role of language in Heidegger’s thinking after the “turn” of the mid-1930s comes from his recognition, already hinted at in Contributions to Philosophy, that the question of being that spans the trajectory of his work is essentially the question, or more precisely, the way, of language. This may be why the last section of Contributions to Philosophy is titled “Language (Its Origin)” (CP, 401), as it outlines briefly the guiding threads of Heidegger’s emerging signature approach: language and the event; language as unfolding from silence; language and the clearing, world, and history; language as strife and rift (Riss); language as both “the first and most extensive humanizing [Vermenschung] of beings” and as the opportunity for the dehumanization or, more emphatically, dishumanization (Entmenschung) of the human being away from its status as “an objectively present living being and ‘subject’ ” (CP, 401). These concerns index the reciprocity between the Destruktion of the metaphysical manner of asking the question of being and the problematic of language.1 Just as much as Heidegger’s repeated rephrasing of the Seinsfrage influences his writings on language, so do the evolving understanding of language and its reflection in Heidegger’s writing practice impact the reformulations of the question of being from the initial prism of the ontological difference to the history of being—with Heidegger increasingly using the older German spelling Seyn—and the event. One of the markers of this shifting approach in the texts from late 1930s is the way Heidegger vacillates between writing about the overcoming (Überwindung) of metaphysics and about the need of an admittedly more radical twisting or torsion (Verwindung) that would bring metaphysics to a turning point. Recognizing the fact that the call for the overcoming of metaphysics remains essentially metaphysical, since it aims to open a further zone of thought “beyond” metaphysics and has a ring of finality to it, Heidegger begins to explore instead the possibility of pushing metaphysics to its edge in order to induce a turn within it that would release thinking from its metaphysical foundations and perhaps let it think otherwise, or at least allow thought to transform its own relation to thinking. In the much later “Time and Being,” Heidegger goes as far as to speak of the need to cease all overcoming and to leave metaphysics to itself (OTB, 24; ZSD, 25).See All Chapters
|Margaret J. Wheatley||Berrett-Koehler Publishers|
A abilities, and emergence, 98 access, need for, 38-39, 82 accomplishment, in a group, 67, 69, 81 accountability, 59 adaptation, 33, 78 alertness/attentiveness, 25-26, 47, 49, 75,
95-96, 98. See also consciousness altruism. See helpfulness
Ammons, A. R., 9 analysis, limitations of, 37, 72-74, 79-81 assessment tools, 80 attitudes, and change, 84, 91 attraction and order, 30, 35, 58, 90 autopoiesis, 47 awareness. See consciousness
B bacteria, examples from, 24, 29, 33, 35, 52, 91 bees, examples from, 43 behavior, in organizations, 81, 84, 87 being present, 25-26 beliefs about organizations, 2-3, 37, 42
importance of, 35, 38, 44, 58, 81-82, 87,
92-96 belonging, and organizations, 62-63, 84, 87,
Bergson, Henri, 13 birds, examples from, 39, 43 boundaries, creation of, 48, 51, 53, 61, 64 brain, and information, 49 bravery, and meaning, 64 bricolage, 17. See also tinkering.
C cactus, 43, 101 capacity, in systems, 74-75, 95 cause and effect, 97 causes, and meaning, 92 censoring, and information, 82 change characteristics of, 13-14, 27, 33, 41, 74,See All Chapters
|Ratzlaff, Lloyd||Thistledown Press||ePub|
I have a gentil cock Croweth me day; He doth me risen early My matins for to say.
—Anonymous fifteenth-century poet
Summer 1973. We turn from the Trans-Canada Highway onto the Yellowhead, and a little red car whizzes past us and disappears over a rise. A moment later we follow, and in the flat panorama, with prairie towns visible on both sides, a long freight train is crossing the highway; and we pull up where warnings clang and flash at the intersection. The train is lumbering to a stop, too, with the engine halfway to Portage la Prairie when the brakes squeal their last, long protest.
We sit with the car idling. In the back seat, our two-year-old daughter teases her infant sister. They don’t understand that their parents’ marriage is already troubled. Something sticks up from the wheatfield beside the road, and I remark that it looks like a piece of farm implement fallen off a flatdeck.
After five minutes I switch off the motor.
The conductor heads forward from the caboose, and in the distance we see the engineer descend from the cab and begin making his way back. A dozen vehicles are stalled behind us now. A few drivers get out to stretch. One leaves a radio playing, and the Eagles come drifting on the summer air, Peaceful easy feeling.See All Chapters
|Wilfred R. Bion||Karnac Books||ePub|
The claim of psycho-analysis to be a scientific procedure has often been challenged by scientists of other disciplines. Stirred by a desire to repudiate what seems to be a denial of the analyst's aspiration to be honest and to state his findings truthfully, psycho-analysts tend either to assume that the criterion is based on a misunderstanding of their work, or else that there is such a thing as scientific method employed by physicists, chemists and others, but that it cannot be used in any valuable way in their own work. The explanation of this attitude probably lies in the nature of psycho-analytic training, which has to cover such an enormous area and is so closely associated with the cure of patients that the would-be analyst can hardly find time to concentrate on the essentials of psycho-analytic theory, let alone investigate metalogic and metatheory. It is likely that if he does so, he will rapidly conclude that they have no relevance to his work and so dismiss both as insignificant.See All Chapters
|Jidda Krishnamurti||Krishnamurti Foundation America||ePub|
Can the mind dissociate the feeling which is called envy from the word?
This is rather a complex process but, if you will kindly listen, I am sure you will get the signicance of it. Let us say I am greedy, envious, and I want to understand that envy completely, not merely get rid of it. Most of us want to get rid of it and try various ways of doing that, for various reasons, but we are never able to get rid of it; it goes on and on indenitely. But if I really want to understand it, go to the root of it completely, then I must not condemn it, surely. The very word envy has a condemnatory sense, I feel, so can the mind dissociate the feeling which is called envy from the word? Because the very terming, giving a name to that feeling as envy, with that very word I have condemned it, have I not? With the word envy is associated the whole psychological and religious signicance of condemnation. So can I dissociate the feeling from the word? If the mind is capable of not associating the feeling with the word, then is there an entity, a me, who is observing it? Because the observer is the association, surely, is the word, is the entity who is condemning it.See All Chapters
|J Krishnamurti||Krishnamurti Foundation America||ePub|
|Martin Heidegger||Indiana University Press||ePub|
Regarding the introduction to The event
The following delimitation is to make less ambiguous the otherwise still-fluctuating lexicon which must constantly maintain a transitional breadth.
expresses the explicitly self-clearing inceptuality of the beginning. The inaugural truth of beyng preserves in itself, as inceptual unification, the inaugural unity of the appropriating and the appropriated. The word “inceptual” always means: appropriated out of the beginning and consigned to the inceptuality. But it does not mean incipient in the sense of mere starting. Being does not start and stop, nor does it exist “perpetually” in the duration of beings. Being begins and does so essentially: it is the appropriating beginning. The event lights up the clearing of the beginning in such a way that the beginning does not merely emerge and bring to appearance along with it something inceptual, as in the first beginning, but, instead, such that the beginning, qua the beginning, is consigned to the truth of its inceptuality, a truth which is therefore illuminated.See All Chapters
|Brook A. Ziporyn||Indiana University Press|
B U D D H A- N AT U R E A N D
So! T h e r e a r e no t h i ngs! T h e r e a r e no de f i n i t i v e , either/or “states”! There is no such thing as a “state” of suffering! Madness, eh? Even if this madness is what is really taught in something called
Mahāyāna Buddhism, does such madness really do us any good? Doesn’t it rather threaten to undermine any notion of what “doing us any good” could possibly mean? Where is it all leading? We may have to wait until we get to the unexpected applications of these ideas in Tiantai thought to a get stronger sense of how all these strange moves lead us somewhere quite novel, perhaps somewhere that might end up being very worth going in surprising ways. But for now let’s move on. What about Nirvana, the cessation of suffering, the absence of suffering? Isn’t that where all this Buddhism stuff is supposed to “lead us”? Obviously that is going to have to be reconceived here too.
W h ate v er Is, Is Not N irva naSee All Chapters
|Shai Held||Indiana University Press||ePub|
THEOLOGICAL METHOD AND RELIGIOUS ANTHROPOLOGY: HESCHEL AMONG THE CHRISTIANS
What kind of theologian was Heschel? Since, like many Jewish thinkers, Heschel talks very little about theological method, it falls to us to piece together what he is doing. With his strong theocentric thrust, Heschel can at moments sound very much like his contemporary, the neo-Orthodox Protestant theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968). Consider, for example, Heschel’s insistence that “the Bible is primarily not man’s vision of God but God’s vision of man. The Bible is not man’s theology but God’s anthropology, dealing with man and what He asks of him.”1 In a strikingly similar vein, Barth declares that “it is not the right human thoughts about God which form the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts about men.”2 But Heschel’s theocentrism should not blind us to the fact that, in the tradition of modern liberal theology, he begins his theology not with divine revelation, but with human experience. He commences not by asking what it is that God has revealed, but rather, as we have seen, by asking what aspects of human nature and experience can render us receptive to revelation. Or, to put it somewhat differently, Heschel begins not already within the contents of revelation, but rather with anthropological prolegomena, with a “critical, transcendental inquiry into the possibility of . . . belief.”3 Although it most assuredly does not end there, Heschel’s theology begins in anthropology. In what follows, I bring Heschel into conversation with some of the major figures in twentieth-century Christian theology as a basis for exploring Heschel’s approach to the intertwined issues of theological method and theological anthropology.4See All Chapters
|Leonard Lawlor||Indiana University Press||ePub|
Near the end of “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson says, “The partial eclipse of metaphysics since the last half century has been caused more than anything else by the extraordinary difficulty the philosopher experiences today in making contact with a science already much too scattered” (CENT: 1432/CM: 200). Science has become scattered “today” because it is based on acquiring knowledge by analysis, that is, by taking up separate and particular viewpoints on things, from the exterior. Analysis is the work done by one faculty, the understanding (in French, l’entendement or, in German, der Verstand: the intellect). The understanding breaks things up and for each separate perspective, it assigns a symbol—so that knowledge looks to be based on symbols, relative to them, and metaphysics, based on relative knowledge, becomes impossible. For Bergson, analysis must be overcome. It is overcome by means of a different faculty, the faculty of intuition. Based in intuition, and not in symbolization, knowledge is immediate and absolute. Through intuition, then, metaphysics is possible once again. According to Bergson there is a second reason why metaphysics went into eclipse in the nineteenth century. In “Introduction to Metaphysics,” again near its end, Bergson speaks of modern philosophy as the reversal of Platonism, reversing the relation of idea (or form) and the soul (or experience). No doubt, Bergson is thinking of Descartes. Yet in the prioritization of the soul, Platonism persists insofar as the understanding—here too in modern metaphysics—defines cognitive activity. Here Bergson is thinking of Kant. No one more than Kant (the Kant of The Critique of Pure Reason, where the faculty of the understanding or the intellect, der Verstand, plays such an important role1), for Bergson has misunderstood the soul. Therefore, insofar as Bergson wants to overcome analysis, we can also say that he wants to overcome modern metaphysics. And if we can say that, then we can say that Bergson’s project bears strong similarities to Heidegger’s project of overcoming metaphysics.2See All Chapters
|Ficino Ficino||Shepheard Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd||ePub|
PLATO'S INTENTION in Hipparchus is to teach us that all men strive after the Good, since even those who seem to go astray through greed are also striving after the Good. Because they desire gain, gain is useful; but the useful is good, and therefore they desire the Good. For gain is the opposite of loss; but since gain is opposed to evil it is the opposite of evil. The opposite of evil is the Good: therefore gain is the Good. For this reason, since even those who seem to fall away from striving for the Good desire the Good, nothing now militates against the fact that all men strive after the Good.
Now the Good is twofold: the first aspect is the end, the second the means to the end. The first is to be sought for its own sake, the second for the sake of something else. The desire for the first is will; the desire for the second is choice. The first is to be honoured, while the second is useful. We enjoy the first, but we use the second. Acquisition of the first is called happiness, and acquisition of the second is called gain. Gain is therefore the useful acquisition of the good, which is conducive to honouring the Good. But if it does not lead to this it is not useful, nor is its acquisition a gain. Thus the desire for gain is praiseworthy, a desire which nature has implanted within all. However, that false view should be rejected which, ignoring what is truly useful and profitable, twists the natural desire towards its opposite.See All Chapters
|J Krishnamurti||Krishnamurti Foundation America||ePub|
|John Llewelyn||Indiana University Press||ePub|
The strictness of a conception may be measured in two ways. A conception will be more strict than another if it requires the fulfilment of a larger number of possible criteria than the other. Alternatively, it may be more strict than another if it insists on the fulfilment of a particular criterion that for the other conception is one of an optional set. That is to say, one may measure strictness either according to the standard of the number of conditions deemed necessary or according to the degree of necessity that is deemed to attach to a particular condition. So a conception that is more strict and more demanding than another according to one of these ways of measuring strictness may not be more strict according to the other way of measuring it.
Emphasized in the methodology of “the phenomenological turn” made by Husserl are (1) intuition or evidence as invoked in “the principle of all principles,” (2) intentionality, (3) description of the as such, (4) bracketing off by reduction of matters of empirical or metaphysical fact and existence, (5) the horizonality of consciousness. That at least some of these factors overlap others among them becomes plain once we consider Husserl’s assertion in the Crisis that “in all cases the world is pregiven and, within this horizon, objects are given. . . . The pregiven world is the horizon which includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing but constant manner, just as an intentional horizon-consciousness implicitly ‘encompasses’ (‘umfasst’) [everything] in advance.”1 Here Husserl is purporting to describe the world experienced in our natural straightforward attitude to it. The “flowing but constant manner” in which the world is lived under that aspect is something that becomes explicit when we make the phenomenological turn in order to describe the horizon of the pregiven in its howness. In this changed perspective “nothing shall interest us but precisely that subjective alteration of manners of givenness, of manners of appearing and of the modes of validity in them, which in its constant process, synthetically connected as it necessarily flows on, brings about the coherent consciousness of the straightforward ‘being’ of the world.”2 Pregiven in this synthetic connectedness is not only the pregivenness of the retained past, but the simultaneous protentiveness of the future. It is a law of essential being, Husserl tells readers of §82 of Ideas, “that every present moment of experience has about it a fringe of experiences, which also share the primordial now-form, and as such constitute the one primordial horizon [Originaritätshorizont] of the pure Ego, its total primordial now-consciousness.”3See All Chapters