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4. “The End of Revolution Is the Foundation of Freedom”

Kathryn T. Gines Indiana University Press ePub

4 “The End of Revolution Is the Foundation of Freedom”

HANNAH ARENDTS On Revolution offers an in-depth study of the concept of revolution, including two of the most influential revolutions of the eighteenth century, the American Revolution and the French Revolution. But Arendt’s evaluation of the American and French Revolutions in this work is full of inconsistencies.1 On the one hand, she identifies similarities, for example noting that the early stages of the American and French Revolutions suggest that they initially sought reforms in the direction of constitutional monarchies and that both were eventually driven to the establishment of republican governments (OR 134). She explores how the American and French Revolutions were formed and influenced by almost identical traditions, but with different experiences and preparation (119). Both revolutions were concerned with freedom, in America with the notion of “public happiness” and in France with the notion of “public freedom” (ibid.). On the other hand, Arendt describes the French Revolution as a failed one that “ended in disaster” and seems disgruntled that it has had a greater place in our memory and in world history than the “triumphantly successful” American Revolution—perhaps another incorrect assumption on her part (56).

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40. Abbot against Royce

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

40

Abbot against Royce

12 November 1891

The Nation

To the Editor of the Nation

Sir:

Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot makes substantially the following charges against Prof. Josiah Royce:

(1) That Prof. Royce libelled Dr. Abbot, and that maliciously.

(2) That Prof. Royce used unfair means to stifle Dr. Abbot’s reply.

I propose to consider impartially what the verdict of students of philosophy ought to be regarding these public accusations against one of the most eminent of their number.

The charge of libel has two specifications, viz:

(1) That Prof. Royce warned the general public against Dr. Abbot as a blatant and ignorant pretender in philosophy.

(2) That Prof. Royce accused Dr. Abbot of plagiarizing Hegel at second hand.

From the point of view of propriety of conduct in a student of philosophy, the only adequate excuse for the first of these acts would be that the fact proclaimed was so unmistakable that there could be no two opinions about it on the part of men qualified by mature study to pass judgment on the merits of philosophical writers. In case the act were not so justified, the offence would be enormously aggravated if it were dictated by malice. The first question, then, is: Did Prof. Royce, as a matter of fact, so warn the public against Dr. Abbot? He certainly did, unequivocally and with full consciousness of what he was about; that is the unmistakable import of his whole article in the International Journal of Ethics for October, 1890. The next question is whether it is so plainly true that Dr. Abbot is a blatant and ignorant pretender in philosophy that it is impossible competent men should think otherwise? So far is that from being the case that philosophers of the highest standing, such men as Kirchheiss in Germany, Renouvier in France, and Seth in

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6. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research

David Farrell Krell Indiana University Press ePub

In this final chapter I will review some of the issues raised in the earlier chapters—those issues that for one reason or other strike me as problematic and as needing further reading, research, and reflection. No doubt, I will have missed many issues that readers may find particularly troublesome or compelling. Yet so many matters have thrust themselves to the fore that I will clearly have great difficulty in organizing them. There will be repetitions as well as omissions, and much meandering. And, no doubt, some of the following remarks will be controversial. The danger of letting your hair down is that it may cover your eyes. My only wish is that the controversial remarks spawn, to repeat, further reading, research, and reflection. That wish is perhaps extravagant given the current academic climate, especially in the English-speaking philosophical world, although not exclusively there, which seems to dedicate itself more to vociferous position-taking these days than to careful study. Yet as extensive and as debilitating as such position-taking is, there remain—if it is not too avuncular of me to say so—a surprising number of students and faculty who are dedicated to careful and critical reading. Let the following questions and concluding rambles be addressed to them, therefore, as an expression of hope in the future.

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7. Laws of Nature (1901)

Edited by the Peirce Edition Project Indiana University Press ePub

 

MS and TS from the Smithsonian Institution Library (doc. 3804.10). [Published in Philip P. Wiener’s Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, pp. 289–321. From a longer paper, “Hume on Miracles and Laws of Nature” and eventually retitled “The Laws of Nature and Hume’s Argument against Miracles,” written at the end of May 1901 at the invitation of Samuel P. Langley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. After many revisions, Langley declined to publish it.] Peirce aims here to explain to non-specialists what laws of nature are and how they have been conceived—his foil being the nominalist conception typical of Hume’s thought and of modern empiricism. Every genuine law of nature is an objective generalization from observations and must support verifiable predictions about future observations. Subjective generalizations put forward as laws of nature cannot pass the test of predictability. In explaining how predictability is possible, Peirce introduces a theme that will come to dominate his later thought: “Must we not say that . . . there is an energizing reasonableness that shapes phenomena in some sense, and that this same working reasonableness has molded the reason of man into something like its own image?” Peirce points out that his evolutionary conception of law is that of the scientific man, claiming that the reliability of laws of nature leads scientists to accept them as facts, “almost to be called [things] of power,” although with the caveat that any such law might be falsified.

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3. John 10:27

Kierkegaard, Søren Indiana University Press ePub

[ 3 ]

Father in Heaven! Your grace and mercy change not with the changing of the times,1 age not with the course of the years, as if you, like a human being, were more gracious on one day than on another, more gracious on the first day than on the last. Your grace remains unchanged, just as you are unchanged, the same, eternally young, new with every new day—for indeed every day you say “this very day.”2 Oh, but if a person pays attention to this phrase, is moved by it, and with pious resolve says earnestly to himself “this very day”—then for him this means that he precisely desires to be changed on this day, precisely desires that this day might be truly significant for him above other days, significant by renewed strengthening in the good he once chose or perhaps even significant by choosing the good. It is your grace and mercy unchangeably to say every day “this very day,”3 but your mercy and time of grace would be forfeited if a human being so unchangeably were to say from day to day “this very day.” You are surely the one who gives the time of grace “this very day,” but the human being is the one who must seize the time of grace “this very day.” This is the way we talk with you, O God; there is a linguistic difference between us, and yet we strive to understand you and to make ourselves intelligible to you, and you are not ashamed to be called our God.4 What is the eternal expression of your unchanged grace and mercy when you say it, O God, that same phrase is the strongest expression of the deepest change and decision when a human being repeats it rightly understood—yes, as if everything would be lost if the change and decision did not happen this very day. So grant then to those who are assembled here today, those who, without any external summons, therefore all the more inwardly, have resolved even today to seek reconciliation with you in the confession of sin, grant them that this day may be a true blessing for them, that they may have heard the voice of him whom you sent to the world,5 the voice of the Good Shepherd,6 that he may know them and that they may follow him.

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7 Persecution in Pakistan and Politicization of Ahmadi Identity

Adil Hussain Khan Indiana University Press ePub

7  Persecution in Pakistan and Politicization of Ahmadi Identity

The Politics of Partition

Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, khalīfat al-masīh II, remained immersed in the Kashmir crisis throughout the 1930s, which led to a sustained rivalry with the Majlis-i Ahrar. By the 1940s, both organizations had diverted their attention to the Second World War, which enabled tensions to simmer in the background for the next few years. By the end of the war, the political priorities of community leaders had shifted once again towards gaining independence from Britain. This meant that there was a greater sense of urgency among organizational leaders to voice concerns about the prospects for self-governance currently under consideration. As the push for independence gained momentum in the public discourse, India’s community leaders went from entertaining proposals to finalizing schemes.1 Although the earliest proposals dated back well into the nineteenth century, by the mid-1940s only two models of governance dominated the debate. The first viable option was rooted in conceptions of Indian nationalism, while the second was rooted in religious separatism. India’s nationalists backed the creation of a single state, represented by a unified India, whereas religious separatists sought the creation of independent states based on religious affiliations. As plans for independence materialized, it became increasingly clear that India would be partitioned along religious grounds. Most separatists, however, still did not want religion to dominate public policy. On the contrary, religious affiliations were primarily intended to serve as a means of determining international boundaries. This made mixed-population states, such as Punjab, problematic for advocates of partition, due to the rich complexity of its religious heritage and the varied distribution of its religious demographic.2 As a result, quarreling about population distributions created confusion which postponed the demarcation of international borders until late in the process.

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5. The Quest for Destruction

Marius Timmann Mjaaland Indiana University Press ePub

Luther and philosophy is a topic that requires careful consideration, since there is a certain discrepancy between Luther’s rhetoric and his actual involvement in philosophical issues. His many more or less uncouth comments on philosophers as sophists, mad, or impious, of reason as a whore, and so forth, should be treated with a grain of salt and ascribed to his image as a barbarian and simple spokesman of the truth from the northern provinces of the Roman Empire. This is an image ascribed to him by his opponents and enemies and exploited in lampoons and caricatures, but it is also an image he cultivates in his raw and subversive style, sometimes with burlesque self-irony.1 The arguments against philosophy and the mockery of the philosophers should therefore be considered rhetorically before we proceed to a discussion of their impact and consequences. If not, there are sometimes conclusions drawn concerning Luther’s alleged rejection of philosophy in general and Aristotelian metaphysics in particular, which have limited foothold in the texts. The barbarian image is deceptive insofar as Luther is an extremely subtle critic of philosophy and thus he cannot avoid getting involved in philosophical arguments. Some of the key arguments will here be discussed, with emphasis on Luther’s destruction of metaphysics in the Heidelberg Disputation (1518) and De servo arbitrio (1525).

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Nine: Truth Be Told: Homer, Plato, and Heidegger

Edited by Jeffrey Powell Indiana University Press ePub

NINE

Truth Be Told: Homer, Plato, and Heidegger

Dennis J. Schmidt

The question that I want to ask concerns what Aristotle called the the basic movement of life. More precisely, I want to ask how we might speak of this movement without losing its elemental unity and its dynamic character. An assumption that I will make, but not defend, is that the language of philosophy—that is, the language of the concept—is poor at following this movement since such language aims at capturing and grasping this movement. But I want to suggest that one finds an interesting answer to this question of the proper way of speaking of this movement of life when one turns to Heidegger’s reading of Homer, since in Homer’s language Heidegger finds a way of following this movement, this movement of all appearance, that is closed to the less agile, conceptual language of philosophy. What Homer offers that is foreclosed to our philosophical habits—habits that are amplified by the habits of understanding characterizing modernity—is a way of speaking of the real struggle defining this movement of life; namely, that life both shows and hides itself in its movement.

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6 The Self That Transcends Itself: Heschel on Prayer

Shai Held Indiana University Press ePub

THE SELF THAT TRANSCENDS ITSELF: HESCHEL ON PRAYER

Heschel’s final work, A Passion for Truth (1973), is a vivid portrayal of the Hasidic master Reb Menahem Mendl of Kotzk (1787–1859), known above all for his zealous pursuit of truth and integrity in the religious life. One of the central preoccupations of both the Kotzker and his biographer is their insistence that falsehood and self-centeredness are inextricably linked, and that so, too, are truth and self-transcendence.1 For Menahem Mendl, there is no greater spiritual and theological problem than humanity’s obstinate self-concern. “The ‘I’,” Heschel writes, “becomes the central problem in the Kotzker’s thinking; it is the primary counterpart to God in the world. The sin of presumptuous selfhood is the challenge and defiance that God faces in the world.”2 The Kotzker had “contempt for the self-centeredness of man,” and he demanded “the abandonment of all self-interest.”3 He insisted, in fact, that an authentic quest for truth is predicated on a “total abandonment of self.”4 To strive to be a Jew, the Kotzker taught, is “to disentangle the self from enslavement to the self ” and to struggle against “the inexhaustible intransigence of self-interest.” Indeed, “for the Kotzker, one became an authentic Jew only when he moved out of the prison of self-interest, responding with abandon to Heaven’s call.” To have faith, the Kotzker taught, “meant to forget the self, to be exclusively intent on God,”5 and to “disregard self-regard.”6

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[THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY SERIES]

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

162

W R I T I N G S OF C H A R L E S S. P E I R C E , 1867-1871

Questions on Reality

MS 148: Winter-Spring 1868

Qu. 1. Whether by the simple contemplation of a cognition, we are enabled in any case to declare with considerable certainty that it is an ultimate premise or cognition not determined by any previous cognition, or whether this is only a hypothesis to be resorted to when the facts cannot be explained by the action of known causes? Ans.

The latter alternative is the true one.

Qu. 2. Whether self-consciousness or our knowledge of ourselves can be accounted for as an inference or whether it is necessary to suppose a peculiar power of immediate self-consciousness? Answer.

It can be accounted for by the action of known causes. Error and ignorance being discovered require the supposition of a self. In short, we can discover ourselves by those limitations which distinguish us from the absolute ego.

Qu. 3. Whether we have the power of accurately distinguishing by simple contemplation without reasoning or combining many circumstances, between what is seen and what is imagined, what is imagined and what is conceived, what is conceived and what is believed, and, in general, between what is known in one mode and what in another? No.

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Coda

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

The purpose of this Part has been to pursue memory beyond mind—or more exactly, to show that it is already beyond it. “Beyond” does not mean simply external to, much less triumphant over. Mind remains essential to human remembering; it continues to exhibit its importance in memorial matters—as we have just witnessed in the case of intrapsychic memorialization. And precisely because an activity like commemorating puts the body/mind dichotomy into suspension, it suggests that mentation continues to be deeply ingredient in memory even when a given act of remembering is not explicitly cogitative in character. Indeed, the rooting of the word “memory” in memor- (mindful)—and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and “reminiscing” in mens (mind)—bespeaks the same ingrediency, as does the striking fact that gemynd in Old English means equally “memory” or “mind.” If we are to move beyond mind in memory in the ways that have been explored in the preceding six chapters, we must not forget that mind always lies close behind memory. However withdrawn it may be as an origin, and however skeptical we may be as to its role in modern theories of memory, it is never altogether absent from the memorial life.

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9. Creation and the Moral Order

Hugh J. McCann Indiana University Press ePub

 

The account of the creator we have been developing is one of a God whose activity in making the universe is completely free and spontaneous, constrained by nothing and distinguished by total mastery over all that he creates. If such an account is correct, we should also expect that God will turn out to be the source of morality—of the rightness of what is right and the wrongness of what is wrong. If he is not—that is, if right and wrong have standing independent of God's will—his sovereignty will be diminished and our earlier argument for divine impeccability will be ruined. For if moral principles have standing independent of God's will, then presumably he, as a rational being, is bound by them just as we are, so that his conduct is subject to strictures not of his own making. Only if God's creative fiat is the source of the moral order can this result be avoided. That God should be the source of morality is also in keeping with the account of sin developed in chapter 6, according to which the crucial defining feature of wrongdoing is rebellion against God, from whose dictates the moral law takes its origin. This account would lose much of its force if it turned out that in issuing moral injunctions to us, God is only passing along information from some other source. Our rebellion in sinning would then be far less of a personal affront to God. It would finally be directed not against our creator, but only against an ideal—which, whatever its provenance and however important it may be, can never be more than an abstraction. Finally, if the principles that define right and wrong can be shown to issue from God, there may be an additional bonus: perhaps we will get help in dealing with the thorny problems that have plagued moral epistemology throughout the modern era.

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17. Beauty Wars: The Struggle over Female Modesty in the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa

PEG Z BRAND Indiana University Press ePub

ALLEN DOUGLAS AND FEDWA MALTI-DOUGLAS

In the past forty years, the Muslim Middle East and North Africa have been the scene of a struggle over fashion, clothing, and makeup—over beauty. This struggle is most often seen as being about the veil or as a process of reveiling. It is actually a battle between competing visions of female display. Often presented as a contest between Western modernity, on the one hand, and Islamic traditionalism, on the other, the struggle is actually between two competing forms of modernity. One favors a more open society with a greater public female presence as well as a greater acceptance of female display and more open forms of courtship. The other, which we can call neopatriarchal, fears the chaos of unregulated sexuality and leans toward greater social control, segregation of the sexes, and female public modesty.

The high point in the region of the open, more secular social vision was marked by the debut of the most popular Egyptian film up to that time, Khally ballak men ZouZou (Watch Out for Zouzou), in 1972. This musical, with screenplay by the Nasserite Salah Jahine, recounts a romance between Zouzou, a lower-class University of Cairo coed, and her wealthy professor. The film ridicules the traditionalist who accuses the heroine of immodesty and immorality. In the happy ending, male and female college students dance in blue jeans. No one is veiled. In a concession to nationalism, the beautiful, black-haired, modern Egyptian heroine is contrasted with a Doris Day clone, an evil relative of the upper-class male heart-throb. Zouzou’s main challenge is overcoming her background as a belly dancer from a family of dancers and popular entertainers. The film takes a middle view of the problem of display implicit in Zouzou’s profession. On the one hand, it argues, she should not be held down by old-fashioned notions of shame. On the other, dancing in night clubs can easily lead to sexual perdition. And of course, viewers are treated to Zouzou’s dark-eyed, full-figured beauty in a variety of dance scenes. Such a film could not be made in Egypt today.

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One. “I Call It Death-in-Life . . .”: Reading Being and Time

David Farrell Krell Indiana University Press ePub

“Life” is not an existential structure of Dasein. Yet Dasein dies. Indeed, it is even born to that end: birth is one of the two ends of an end-like or finite existence—Dasein natal, Dasein fatal. In this regard Heidegger entertains the testimony of a medieval Bohemian peasant, one who has recently become a widower, and who therefore has a complaint against Death. However, Heidegger follows the lead of his anonymous medieval predecessor by allowing Death to have the last word. Der Ackermann aus Böhmen begins:

Grimmiger tilger aller leute, schedelicher echter aller werlte, freissamer morder aller menschen, ir Tot, euch sei verfluchet!

Malevolent subverter of all the people, thoroughly malignant to all the world, murderous devourer of all mankind, thou Death, my curse upon you!

Death, offended by the farmer’s vituperation, replies:

Weistu des nicht, so wisse es nu: als balde ein mensche geboren wird, als balde hat es den leikauf getrunken, das es sterben sol. Anefanges geswisterde ist das ende. . . . [A]ls schiere ein mensche lebendig wird, als schiere ist es alt genug zu sterben.

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4 Politics and the Ahmadiyya Movement under Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad

Adil Hussain Khan Indiana University Press ePub

4  Politics and the Ahmadiyya Movement under Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad

The “Rangīlā Rasūl” Incident: The “Playboy” Prophet

By 1925, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad had missionaries diligently setting up Ahmadi centers all over the world. Ahmadi Islam had touched virtually every continent through the establishment of local chapters in Western Europe, North America, both East and West Africa, Mauritius, Syria, and Palestine. It was the communal tensions back home in India, however, that were creating the greatest stir. Hindu-Muslim tensions had been building steadily before they came to a head in the late 1920s. Polemic pamphlets blaspheming religious rivals were popular on both sides when a spirited Arya Samajist published the Rangīlā Rasūl booklet in 1924, attributing a number of sexual exploits to the Prophet Muhammad.1 The publication managed to capture the attention of Muslim India. The Arya polemicist responsible, Rajpal, was initially convicted under section 153A of India’s penal code in an attempt to keep communal tensions under control. This amounted to a sentence of eighteen months in prison and a 1,000-rupee fine. But the Punjab High Court overturned the decision in June 1927 and acquitted Rajpal of the charges. In addition, the high court’s Hindu justice, Dalip Singh, imprisoned the editor of Lahore’s Muslim Outlook for expressing outrage following the acquittal, which only exacerbated the situation from the perspective of Punjab’s Muslims. Defending the Prophet quickly became the focus of ordinary Muslims throughout India as a result.

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