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Afterword of the Editors of the Lecture Course Winter Semester 1920–21

Martin Heidegger Indiana University Press ePub

Afterword of the Editors of the Lecture Course Winter Semester 1920–21

Martin Heidegger held the lecture course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” as a private lecturer in the winter semester 1920–1921 at the University of Freiburg. According to the schedule of courses, it was held Tuesdays and Fridays from noon to one o'clock. It began on October 29, 1920; the last class was held on February 25, 1921. This is what it says in the dating of the postscripts.

The manuscript of the lecture course is lost. Even an announcement by the manager of the Nachlass in several wide-circulating newspapers brought no hint of its location. Yet there are five sets of notations, which allow for the approximate reconstruction of the train of thought and articulation of the lecture course. Three of these notations (Oskar Becker, Helene Weiß, Franz-Josef Brecht) are found in the German Literary Archives of Marbach; two are kept in the Husserl Archive of Leuven. From the total notations it is clear that Heidegger's lecture course falls into two distinctly differentiated parts, which are separated by a caesura at the end of the lecture on November 30, 1920. In Oskar Becker's notations, which employ a separate pagination for each of the two parts, the end of the first part is marked by the following sentence: “Owing to uncalled-for objections [Einwänden Unberufener], broken off on the 30th of November, 1920.” A query addressed to the archive of the University of Freiburg could find no explanation of the sort of objections. Presumably through these Heidegger saw himself forced to proceed abruptly from the extensive “Methodological Introduction” to the “Phenomenological Explication of Concrete Religious Phenomena”—thus the title of the second part of the lecture course according to Becker. Becker's quite legible notation probably derives from stenographical notes which were immediately transcribed after each lecture. Even if he at times significantly simplified Heidegger's sentences, and, as a rule, shortened them as well as providing his own structure, his notations can serve, in regard to the first part of the lecture course, as a foundation for the preparation of the text. Becker's notes on the first part of the lecture course are complete; in the second part are missing the lectures given on December 10th, and those from the 10th to the 20th of February.

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Medium 9781934989128

Confusions and Convictions

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9780253372017

8. The Axioms of Intuition. After Kant

Peirce, Charles S. PDF

Axioms of Intuition, 1859 31


The Axioms of Intuition

After Kant

MS 50: May 1859

All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities.

An extensive quantity is that wherein the representation of parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes in the synthesis) the representation of the whole.

Axiom I

Space has three dimensions.

Proof. Space is the form of the external sense. Our knowledge of external things can only be of qualities; and since all knowledge is discrimination I can only know them by their difference of quality. And this difference of quality must exist at each moment of time. It cannot be a mere difference in quantity, because different quantities differing also in quality must be observable at the same time. And difference in quality necessitates the possibility of entire difference of quality; and this therefore must be expressed in the conditional form of intuition.

But since space and time are the only forms of intuition, there can be no difference in the universe except difference in space and difference in time. This entire difference in quality therefore is a difference in space not a difference in quantity—an entire difference in position with no difference in distance—in short is dimension.

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Medium 9780253334381

The Intruder

Alphonso Lingis Indiana University Press ePub

kant isolated and elucidated the imperative to give a reason which the rational subject obeys. This imperative is not simply an order observed outside, in the practice of a certain kind of society. The rational subject obeys an imperative that, Kant set out to show, weighs immediately on the mind of the individual. The rational community takes form as a result of this prior subjection to an imperative which each thoughtful subject discovers in himself.

Kant conceived the rational community as a republic of autonomous agents, each obeying the order that commands the others by obeying the order he legislates for himself. But when we examine how, in Kant’s analysis, the rational agent encounters the other, we find that the figure of the other, rationally comprehended, doubles up into an image of sensuous suffering and mortality. In this double visage of the other, we can see a double contact with him and a double community taking form.

Thought, conceptual thought, is the practice of conceiving for sensory patterns we perceive; for the masses, forces, and resistances we manipulate; for the looks, vocalizations, and gestures of others, consistent and coherent conceptual terms. Rational thought is the practice of formulating, for observations, the laws of nature, formulating, for actions and operations, technical rules, and formulating, for encounters with others, the order of society. Thought represents the shifting sensory patterns of our environment with consistent and coherent empirical concepts and represents the environment as a whole comprehensively with the laws of nature. Thought represents the forces and resistances of the field about us with the means-end order of practicable reality. Thought represents the looks, voices, and gestures of others about the thinker with the economic, juridic, and political rules of the social order.

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13. Organic Empathy: Feminism, Psychopharmaceuticals, and the Embodiment of Depression

Stacy Alaimo Indiana University Press ePub

Elizabeth A. Wilson

Judith Kegan Gardiner opened her 1995 review of Listening to Prozac, Talking Back to Prozac, and Prozac Nation for the journal Feminist Studies with this anecdote:

I recently attended an interdisciplinary feminist meeting that assumed a consensus about social constructionism and criticized scholarly work that was perceived as “essentialist,” because it implied a biological basis for gender attributes. During meals and breaks, however, I heard a different story. Several women were taking Prozac or similar drugs for depression. Some of their children, who had been difficult, “underachieving,” or disruptive in school, were also being medicated. These informal discussions centered on symptoms, side effects, and relief. They implied but did not discuss a view of personality as biochemically influenced. . . . The potential contradiction between such private solutions and the publicly avowed ideology of social constructionism was never voiced. (Gardiner 1995, 501–502)

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Medium 9781576750506


Margaret J. Wheatley Berrett-Koehler Publishers PDF

N neatness, 13, 97 networks, complexity in, 31, 32, 39, 81, 90,

97 newness, 89, 92, 95, 96 niches, 42-43 nurture, in organizations, 38-39, 58

O objectivity, as illusion, 97 observation, function of, 26, 54, 97 openness, in organizations, 39, 86, 100-102.

See also inquiring organizations. order, attraction of, 6, 14, 17, 22, 28, 61, 68.

See also organization. order for free, 31, 32, 35, 37 organization and emergence, 76-87 and play, 20-27 and relationships, 30, 56, 70-71, 74, 92 characteristics of, 3, 28-45, 50, 81 control in, 76-81, 86 experiment with lightbulbs, 31 spontaneity in, 3, 5, 31-32, 35-36, 38, 56,

77. See also self-organization. organization-as-object, 38 organizations and change, 41, 76 and meaning, 36, 57, 92 and right answers, 13, 15, 21, 99 healthy characteristics of, 26, 56-64 hostility in, 36 organizers, role of, 35 organizing-as-process, 38 originality, as gift, 72 oxygen, as challenge to life, 29, 91

P paradoxes, 41, 48, 51, 53, 90


a simpler way

parallel systems, 23-24, 27, 68 parsimony, as nonvalue, 24, 97 participation, 73, 96 partnering, 35, 42, 95, 97, 101, 103 passion, and organization, 39, 57, 62-63 perceptions, of world, 49 perfection, and trust, 84 pesticides, 91 photosynthesis, invention of, 29

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12. From Race/Sex/Etc. To Glucose, Feeding Tube, and Mourning: The Shifting Matter of Chicana Feminism

Stacy Alaimo Indiana University Press ePub

Suzanne Bost

Illness granted me a set of experiences otherwise unobtainable. It liberated me from the routines which would have delivered me, unchallenged and unchanged, to discreet death. . . . The experience has also ratified my conviction that I, and therefore you, are unequivocally physical constructs, if spectacularly complicated ones.

—Inga Clendinnen, The Tiger’s Eye

When Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga first collaborated on This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color at the end of the 1970s, their primary concern was addressing the simultaneous oppressions experienced by women of color along the axes of race, class, sex, and sexuality. As they challenged the masculinist subject of Chicano nationalism, these writers turned to coalition building and editorial collaboration to locate themselves at the intersection of multiple sociopolitical identifications. Collections like Bridge shifted feminist criticism toward a greater sensitivity to the ways in which feminist identity politics traverse racial and sexual differences. One limitation of this critical focus is a myopic tendency to see identity only in terms of existing sociopolitical categories, especially race and sex, rather than imagining new ways of thinking about identity and new foundations for forming coalitions (like physical needs or shared environments that are not race-or sex-specific). Moreover, since this theoretical shift of twenty-five years ago, discussions of “race/sex/etc.” are increasingly superficial: lists repeated by rote, apologies for failing to account for how heterogeneity might complicate an argument, and untheorized gestures toward inclusiveness that do not think critically about the messy corporeal, psychological, and political matter of race, sex, or the empty “etc.”1 Identity politics often protect their boundaries by not analyzing their interiors.

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Medium 9780946439980


Wilfred R. Bion Karnac Books ePub

Theorem of Pythagoras—Euclid 1.47

The side subtending the right angle: the sides containing the right angle. How much can be obtained by ignoring the figure, the diagram, except in so far as it serves a function—like that of the material of a sculpture by Henry Moore—in framing the place where there is no material? To act as a boundary to the open space, that is to say the part where the figure is not.

Then the squares on the sides containing, and the squares on the side subtending, the right angle serve to enclose the triangle—the ‘three-kneed thing’, but also the right angle.

The construction is a trap for light.

Pons Asinorum + Positions

Euclid I.5 marks the point at which the ‘elements’ of geometry are left behind when the student crosses the Pons.

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Medium 9780253337894

XII Freedom in Remembering

Edward S. Casey Indiana University Press ePub

Memory is a kind of accomplishment a sort of renewal even an initiation

—William Carlos Williams, Paterson

This is the use of memory: for liberation—not less of love but expanding of love beyond desire, and so liberation from the future as well as the past.

—T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” (Four Quartets)



In the course of this book we have seen an eidetic and intentional analysis of remembering—in which recollection played a privileged role—give way to a concern with the outreach of memories into the surrounding world of the remembering subject. This outreach led us to explore reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing as three ways in which the mentalistic model of act-intentionality proved to be inadequate. The transcending of mind as a container of memories was even more strikingly evident in our investigations of body memories, place memories, and various forms of commemoration. As we pursued memory beyond mind we continually found a centrifugal movement outward from the rememberers mind into his or her world—a world filled with perceptual objects and historical events, signs and texts, rituals and other people. So engaging is this world that the insertion of memories into it, their manifold modes of connection with it, came to be described as a matter of “thick autonomy”—a density of involvement that, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, inheres in recollection itself.

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Medium 9780253372017


Peirce, Charles S. PDF

Limits of Religious Thought, 1859 37


An essay on the Limits of

Religious thought written to prove that we can reason upon the nature of God

MS 53: August 1859


What can we discuss? Can we discuss nothing we do not comprehend? Can we not even discuss that which has no existence in nature or the imagination? We can discuss whatever we can syllogise upon.

We can syllogize upon whatever we can define. And strange as it is we can give intelligible comprehensible definitions of many things which can never be themselves comprehended.

I will give two instances of this; one simple and the other practical.

Suppose somebody should talk about an OG and when you asked him what he meant he should say it was a four-sided triangle. You would proceed to show that he had no such conception that nobody had. You would reason upon that which you could not conceive of. This instance is too elementary. Suppose someone should tell me he could imagine two persons interchanging identities. I should proceed to reason on the pretended imagination and show that it was inconceivable.

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Medium 9781608682294

2. Epictetus and the Art of Maintaining Control

Jules Evans New World Library ePub

RHONDA CORNUM WAS WORKING as a flight surgeon in the 101st Airborne Division during the First Gulf War in February 1991, when she was sent on a mission to rescue a fighter pilot who had been shot down. Her own helicopter was shot down, and crashed into the Arabian Desert at 140 miles an hour, instantly killing five of the eight crew. Cornum survived, although both her arms were broken, a ligament was torn in her knee, and she had a bullet lodged in her shoulder. Iraqi soldiers surrounded the crashed helicopter, and dragged Cornum out by her broken arms. They put her and another member of the crew, Sergeant Troy Dunlap, into the back of a truck. As the truck bumped along the desert road, one of the Iraqi soldiers unzipped Cornum’s flight suit and sexually assaulted her. She couldn’t fight him off, and tried not to scream, but every time he knocked her broken arms she couldn’t help crying out. Eventually he left her alone. Sergeant Dunlap was chained up next to her, unable to help. “Ma’am,” he said quietly, “you’re really tough.” “What’d you think, I’d cry or something?” she said. “Yeah, I thought you would.” “That’s okay, Sergeant,” Rhonda said after a while. “I thought you’d cry too.” They were kept prisoner in an Iraqi military compound for eight days. Cornum has said of the experience: “Being a POW is the rape of your entire life. But what I learned in those Iraqi bunkers and prison cells is that the experience doesn’t have to be devastating, that it depends on you.”1

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Medium 9780253329653

11. Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil

Daniel HowardSnyder Indiana University Press ePub


That the world contains the evils it does obviously poses a challenge to traditional theism. For some it is logical in that a contradiction is supposed to be deducible from the coexistence of God and evil. Almost everyone now believes that adequate defenses have been devised to neutralize this challenge, a defense being a description of a possible world containing both God and the evils in question. In such a world God has a morally exonerating excuse for permitting these evils. In particular, it is claimed that the free-will defense, in at least one of its many versions, succeeds in reconciling God’s existence with moral evil—evil that is attributable to creaturely misuse of free will. In my book, On the Nature and Existence of God, I argued that no version of this defense works, and thereby the logical problem posed by moral evil is still with us. This, however, will not be my concern in this paper.

Evil also can be seen as posing an evidential challenge because the evils found in the world are supposed to lower the probability that God exists, and, for some atheologians, so much so that it is less than one-half. There are two different theistic responses to this challenge. The strongest response takes the form of a theodicy, which is a defense plus some argument for thinking that the possible world in which God and evil coexist is the actual world. The weaker response, which I will call “defensive skepticism,” is either (i) a defense coupled with an argument for our not being cognitively capable of finding out whether or not the possible world described in this defense is the actual world or (ii) just an argument for our not being cognitively capable of determining whether or not any evil is “gratuitous” in the sense that there is not in fact, though there could be, a circumstance that would constitute a morally exonerating excuse for God’s permitting it.

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Medium 9781934989159

VII. In Summation

Jidda Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub

During the last talks or discussions, we have been considering the question of self-knowledge. Because, as we said, without being aware of ones own process of thought and feeling, it is obviously not possible to act rightly or think rightly. So the essential purpose of these gatherings or discussions or meetings is really to see if one can, for oneself, directly experience the process of ones own thinking and be aware of it integrally. Most of us are aware of it supercially, on the upper or supercial level of the mind, but not as a total process. It is this total process that gives freedom, that gives comprehension, that gives understanding, and not the partial process. Some of us may know ourselves partially; at least we think we know ourselves a little, but that little is not sufcient, because if one knows oneself slightly, it acts as a hindrance rather than a help. And it is only in knowing oneself as a total processphysiologically and psychologically, the hidden, unconscious, deeper layers as well as the supercial layersit is only when we know the total process that we are able to deal with the problems that inevitably arise, not partially, but as a whole.

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Why This Urge to Possess?

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub
Medium 9781934989111

Chapter 31: What Is the True Function of a Teacher?

J Krishnamurti Krishnamurti Foundation America ePub

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