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1. [The Logic Notebook]

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

Logic Notebook, 1867

1

/The Logic Notebooky

MS 140: March-December 1867

1867 March 23

I cannot explain the deep emotion with which I open this book again. Here I write but never after read what I have written for what

I write is done in the process of forming a conception. Yet I cannot forget that here are the germs of the theory of the categories which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child. In it

I shall live when oblivion has me—my body.

This matter of the logical principles of the different kinds of inference is a difficult matter. One way of putting it would be this.

Every symbol denotes certain objects and connotes certain characters. The symbol represents each of those objects to have each of those characters. The symbol may be a false one; it may be that the objects it denotes do not have the characters it connotes. But if S is

M in this sense—not merely that M is a name for S but that it is the name of a class of things among which S is and if M is P not merely in the sense that then S is P.

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56. Review of Curry’s The Province of Expression

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56

Review of Curry’s

The Province of Expression

14 July 1892

The Nation

The Province of Expression: A search for principles underlying adequate methods of developing Dramatic and Oratoric Delivery. By S. S. Curry, Ph.D., Dean, School of Expression; Instructor of Elocution, Harvard College, etc. Boston: School of

Expression. 1891.

The name Elocution, which, even with our own early writers, was nearly equivalent to eloquence, having been subsequently transferred to the subsidiary art of delivery, is at last degraded by Dr. Curry to designate an offensive display of technique without soul or real art. This leaves him no better word than “expression” by which to designate the art usually termed elocution. In this essay, which it is certainly not too much to call thoughtful and refined, although it might be found disappointing to a reader who were to expect the profound philosophy to which the adepts of this art nowadays make pretensions, four different schools of delivery are recognized as traditional—the imitative, the mechanical (that of Rush), the impulsive, and the speculative (that of

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47. The Man of Genius

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47

The Man of Genius

25 February 1892

The Nation

The Man of Genius. By Cesare Lombroso, Professor of Legal

Medicine in the University of Turin. [The Contemporary Science

Series.] Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891.

Prof. Lombroso comes to us with a proposition not absolutely new, but which he makes claim now to prove for the first time. It is that genius is a mental disease, allied to epileptiform mania and in a lesser degree to the dementia of cranks, or mattoids, as he calls them; so that, far from being a mental perfection, it is a degenerate and diseased condition. The inevitable corollary must be, though Prof. Lombroso does not draw it, that the whole of civilization is due to insanity. If so, it is a disease like pearls, fat livers, and ambergris, which we had better try to propagate, in others. But our Napoleons, our Pythagorases, our Newtons, and our Dantes must no longer run at large, but be confined in

Genius Asylums as fast as they betray themselves.

To prove his proposition, Prof. Lombroso proceeds inductively. In order, therefore, to judge of his work, we will examine the first induction he offers with some care. This first generalization is that geniuses are, on the average, of smaller stature than ordinary men. Here is his reasoning:

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[THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY SERIES]

Charles S. Peirce Indiana University Press PDF

162

W R I T I N G S OF C H A R L E S S. P E I R C E , 1867-1871

Questions on Reality

MS 148: Winter-Spring 1868

Qu. 1. Whether by the simple contemplation of a cognition, we are enabled in any case to declare with considerable certainty that it is an ultimate premise or cognition not determined by any previous cognition, or whether this is only a hypothesis to be resorted to when the facts cannot be explained by the action of known causes? Ans.

The latter alternative is the true one.

Qu. 2. Whether self-consciousness or our knowledge of ourselves can be accounted for as an inference or whether it is necessary to suppose a peculiar power of immediate self-consciousness? Answer.

It can be accounted for by the action of known causes. Error and ignorance being discovered require the supposition of a self. In short, we can discover ourselves by those limitations which distinguish us from the absolute ego.

Qu. 3. Whether we have the power of accurately distinguishing by simple contemplation without reasoning or combining many circumstances, between what is seen and what is imagined, what is imagined and what is conceived, what is conceived and what is believed, and, in general, between what is known in one mode and what in another? No.

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40. Abbot against Royce

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40

Abbot against Royce

12 November 1891

The Nation

To the Editor of the Nation

Sir:

Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot makes substantially the following charges against Prof. Josiah Royce:

(1) That Prof. Royce libelled Dr. Abbot, and that maliciously.

(2) That Prof. Royce used unfair means to stifle Dr. Abbot’s reply.

I propose to consider impartially what the verdict of students of philosophy ought to be regarding these public accusations against one of the most eminent of their number.

The charge of libel has two specifications, viz:

(1) That Prof. Royce warned the general public against Dr. Abbot as a blatant and ignorant pretender in philosophy.

(2) That Prof. Royce accused Dr. Abbot of plagiarizing Hegel at second hand.

From the point of view of propriety of conduct in a student of philosophy, the only adequate excuse for the first of these acts would be that the fact proclaimed was so unmistakable that there could be no two opinions about it on the part of men qualified by mature study to pass judgment on the merits of philosophical writers. In case the act were not so justified, the offence would be enormously aggravated if it were dictated by malice. The first question, then, is: Did Prof. Royce, as a matter of fact, so warn the public against Dr. Abbot? He certainly did, unequivocally and with full consciousness of what he was about; that is the unmistakable import of his whole article in the International Journal of Ethics for October, 1890. The next question is whether it is so plainly true that Dr. Abbot is a blatant and ignorant pretender in philosophy that it is impossible competent men should think otherwise? So far is that from being the case that philosophers of the highest standing, such men as Kirchheiss in Germany, Renouvier in France, and Seth in

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