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4 AVIGNON

Tristan Rutherford FrommerMedia ePub

4

Avignon

Avignon

691km (428 miles) S of Paris; 83km (51 miles) NW of Aix-en-Provence; 98km (61 miles) NW of Marseille

In the 14th century, Avignon was the capital of Christendom. What started as a temporary stay by Pope Clement V in 1309, when Rome was deemed too dangerous even for clergymen, became a 67-year golden age. The cultural and architectural legacy left by the six popes who served during this period makes Avignon one of Europe’s most alluring medieval destinations.

Today this walled city of some 95,000 residents is a major stop on the route from Paris to the Mediterranean. In recent years, it has become known as a cultural center, thanks to its annual international performing-arts festivals and wealth of experimental theaters and art galleries.

Essentials

ArrivingFrequent TGV trains depart from Paris’s Gare de Lyon. The ride takes 2 hours and 40 minutes and arrives at Avignon’s modern TGV station, located 6 minutes from town by a brand-new speedy rail link. The one-way fare is around 80€ depending on the date and time, although it can also be as cheap as 25€ if booked well in advance. Regular trains arrive from Marseille (trip time: 70 min.; 20.80€ one-way) and Arles (trip time: 20 min.; 7.50€ one-way), arriving at either the TGV or Avignon’s central station. Hourly trains from Aix-en-Provence (trip time: 20 min.; 25€ one-way) shuttle exclusively between the two towns’ TGV stations. For rail information, visit www.voyages-sncf.com or call ✆ 36-35. The regional bus routes (www.info-ler.fr; ✆ 08-21-20-22-03) go from Avignon to Arles (trip time: 1 hr., 10 min.; 7.10€ one-way) and Aix-en Provence (trip time: 1 hr., 15 min.; 17.40€ one-way). The bus station at Avignon is the Gare Routière, 5 av. Monclar (✆ 04-90-82-07-35). If you’re driving from Paris, take A6 south to Lyon, and then A7 south to Avignon.

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IMPROVING PROVISION FOR CHILDREN

Sheila Hollins Karnac Books ePub

Rod Morgan

Setting the scene

The Youth Justice Board (YJB), which I have the honour to chair, does not provide services. It commissions and purchases them. And monitors contract compliance and general performance by those agencies that do deliver youth justice services. The latter include the 155 local authority youth offending teams (YOTs) in England and Wales and the various agencies—the Prison Service, several commercial companies and a number of local authorities—that provide closed residential accommodation for those children and young persons, or juveniles, who the criminal courts determine must be held in custody (for a general overview of the role of the YJB see YJB 2004a).

There are currently approximately 2800 children and young persons, aged 10-17 years inclusive, in custody. Most older children aged 15-17—and with this audience, as when I talk to sentencers, I am going to refer to them as children so as to emphasize their status in law and our international rights obligations to them—are overwhelmingly accommodated in Prison Service-managed Young Offender Institutions (YOIs). Those of middling years, and older children who, for one reason or another, cannot cope with life on the mainstream in YOIs, are generally held in one of four commercially-operated Secure Training Centres (STCs). And younger children are generally held in the fifteen local authority secure community homes (LASCHs) with which the YJB contracts.

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5: Kofi Annan’s Conflict Resolution Model and Peacebuilding in Kenya

Edited by Kenneth Omeje and Tricia Redek Indiana University Press ePub

Alfred Anangwe

KENYANS WENT TO the polls in December 2007 to elect their leaders amid rumors and fears of a possible rigging by the incumbent government. These fears were informed by three factors: First, President Kibaki appointed commissioners to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) without consulting the opposition. Second, he announced the election date too late. Third, he went on to appoint judges to the High Court just days before the election. It was feared that the ECK commissioners would facilitate the rigging while the judges would rule in favor of the president in the event of an election petition. After the elections, these fears seemed to have been substantiated when independent election observers declared that the elections were not free and fair (Murunga 2009). Worse still, the chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu, remarked that it was not possible to tell who actually won the presidential race. All these factors triggered the political violence that took place minutes after the winner of the presidential polls was announced. It was also apparent that youth unemployment, regional development imbalances, and the results of the 2005 constitutional referendum—which aggravated the country’s polarization along ethnic lines—catalyzed the violence (see Ojielo, this volume).

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7. Forging a Moral Identity in Business

Damon, William Berrett-Koehler Publishers ePub

147

There are two hazards in writing about morality. The first is that readers will dismiss it as marginal to their real-world concerns, an idealistic luxury that has little to do with our daily struggles for survival or fights for fame and glory. This hazard arises from a misunderstanding about what morality is and how it works in the real world. The aim of this book is to clear up this misunderstanding with a detailed explanation of how morality creates a valuable business advantage for those who employ it consistently and imaginatively. But the second hazard is less direct and harder to combat. It is that people who speak or write about morality have a way of sounding moralistic, preachy, and, worst of all, holier-than-thou.

It is essential that I take this second hazard head on at the outset of this chapter, not only because I do not wish to sound like a preachy prig, but also because being moralistic (as opposed to being moral) is antithetical to the message that I wish to convey. Being consistently moral is a matter of virtue, and humility is one of the primary virtues, in business as well as in life in general. People who are moralistic tend to be arrogant rather than humble, and their sense of superiority can lead their judgments and their choices astray. It also prevents them from learning from their mistakes— and everyone makes mistakes.

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4 “When Ivan Comes, There Will Be Nothing Left”: Rebuilding and Reimagining the Historic Monuments in Leningrad’s Suburbs

Steven M. Maddox Indiana University Press ePub

FOUR

The restoration of the imperial palaces and parks surrounding the city was a key element in Leningrad’s postwar restoration. The Germans had taken Gatchina, Pavlovsk, Peterhof, and Pushkin at the end of August 1941. During the occupation they systematically pillaged, defiled, and partially destroyed the historic monuments in these suburbs. When they were forced to retreat from their positions, they burned and blew up much of what remained of the eighteenth-century landmarks. After the Soviet forces captured the suburbs in mid-January 1944, what they found could be summed up in what Richard Wurf, a rank-and-file German soldier, wrote on the wall of the Gatchina Palace: “We were here, but we will not return. When Ivan comes, there will be nothing left.”1

Despite – and arguably because of – the vast scale of destruction (the Germans having carried out this promise), the country’s preservationist community was determined to restore the suburban palaces to their prewar state. Immediately after the suburbs were liberated, preservationists and architectural authorities from Leningrad and Moscow held meetings and conferences to discuss restoration, as well as what the palaces would be used for. At the time, however, the colossal damage inflicted upon the palaces led some officials to believe that restoration was impossible. In the ensuing fight to have the suburban palace-park complexes restored, preservationists were able to draw upon official state ideology and argue that these historic sites were irreplaceable symbols of Russian power and imperial might. The preservationists’ desire for almost complete restoration conflicted with the central authorities’ early plans of only partial restoration, leading to a compromise calling for the restoration of the suburban palaces to varying degrees.

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